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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2010, street gangs in the San Salvador suburb of Mejicanos
opened fire on a bus, then doused it with gasoline, and set it on fire, 
killing fourteen people.1  Moments later, gang members opened fire on a 
second bus on the same route, killing two people.2 Although this is a 
single recent and heinous incident, gangs have terrorized El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras since the 1990s.3  Nevertheless, on December 
15, 2009, Judge Richard A. Posner, on behalf of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, held that former members of these same violent 
gangs are a particular social group and may be eligible for withholding
of removal or asylum protection in the United States.4
 1. Alex Renderos, 16 killed in El Salvador bus attacks, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2010, at
A3.
2. Gang members burn bus in El Salvador, killing 14, USA TODAY, June 21, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 12608523. 
3. See Tim McGirk, Gang-Bangers: A Deadly U.S. Export, TIME MAGAZINE (online 
ed.), Nov. 3, 2000, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,59613,00.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2011). 
4. Although there is no statutory definition of “particular social group,” the Board
of Immigration Appeals has defined it as a group whose members: (1) share a common
characteristic that they cannot change or should not be expected to change; and (2) possess a
418
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The petitioner testified before the Seventh Circuit that he was a 
member of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in El Salvador from 1994–2003.5 
After he arrived in the United States, Benitez Ramos became a Christian
and quit the gang.6  Benitez Ramos claimed that if he is removed to El
Salvador, he will not rejoin MS-13 because he is a Christian and the 
gang will kill him on account of his refusal to join.7 Although he left El 
Salvador approximately seven years prior, the petitioner claimed that the 
gang will easily recognize him because he has MS-13 tattoos on his face 
and body.8  In regards to his nine years of membership in a violent street 
gang, Judge Posner stated, “If he is found to have committed violent acts 
while a member of the gang . . . he may be barred from the relief he
seeks . . . for remember the bar for aliens who commit a serious
nonpolitical crime.”9 
Country conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras will require 
U.S. courts to address complex protection law issues involving current 
and former gang members, as well as their victims. For example,
just three months after the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Sixth Circuit 
also held that former gang members were a particular social group.10  In
order to ensure proper handling of these cases, advocates, adjudicators,
government attorneys, and judges must acquire a high level of understanding 
of gangs and violence in the affected countries.  To facilitate this process,
this paper will synthesize and analyze publicly available information on 
gangs and violence in Central America.  The information will be categorized 
into the following sections: (1) gang origins and structure; (2) gang
recruitment, initiation and disassociation; (3) gang crimes and links to
organized crime; and (4) social perception, state response, and the 
recognized level of social visibility.  In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (BIA 1996); 
Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).  Judge Posner reasoned that
former gang membership is an immutable characteristic because it is impossible to change,
except perhaps by rejoining the gang.  The Court, however, did not specifically address whether 
former gang members possess social visibility.  Rather, Judge Posner said that it is unclear 
whether the BIA uses the term social visibility in the literal sense or in the external criterion 
sense.  Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009). 
5. Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 428. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id.  Mr. Benitez Ramos, having an indigo MS-13 tattoo on his forehead, returned to
El Salvador and lives in the countryside under conditions comparable to house arrest. 
Julia Preston, On Gangs, Asylum Law Offers Little, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at A16. 
9. Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 431. 
10. Urbina Mejía v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365–66 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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resurgence of clandestine death squads.  An understanding of this
information should incline the courts to grant protection to deserving
individuals, to wit victims, and not members or former members of the 
criminal class, irrespective of their membership in a creatively crafted
particular social group.
II. GANG ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE
The origin of MS-13 and 18th Street (Mara 18 or M-18) helps to 
explain why gang members, irrespective of where they joined the gang, 
come to the United States.  Publicly available reports on gangs only
contain general information on the overall structure and character of
gangs. Nevertheless, it is believed that the gangs in Central America are
organized in much the same way as they are in the United States. 
A. Origin of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street            
(Mara 18 or M-18) 
The largest gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are M-18
and MS-13. Originally known as 18th Street, M-18 was formed in the 
1960s by Mexican-American youth in the Rampart neighborhood of Los
Angeles, California.11  The founders of the gang started M-18 because
they were excluded from the Clanton Street gang.12  The gang grew by 
incorporating members of various races and ethnicities, including Central 
Americans as they arrived in large numbers in the 1980s.13 
MS-13 was formed in the early 1980s by Salvadoran youth in the 
Rampart neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.14  Salvadoran youth
complained that they were often the victims of Mexican-American and 
African-American gangs long established in their new communities.15 
Thus, MS-13 was created to provide a mode of self-protection exclusively
 11. CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34233, THE MS-13 AND 18TH 
STREET GANGS: EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS? 4 (2008). 
12. Al Valdez, California’s Most Violent Export, http://www.streetgangs.com/topics/
2002/18thexport.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).  Another version explains that 18th
Street was originally a clique, or cell, of Clanton 14.  The clique eventually grew large enough
to separate from Clanton 14.  Alex Alonso, 18th Street Gang in Los Angeles County, http://
www.streetgangs.com/hispanic/18thstreet (last visited Jan. 22, 2011). 
13. FRANCO, supra note 11, at 4. 
14. PBS Newshour, FBI Targets MS-13 Street Gang, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www. 
pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec05/gangs_10-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2011). 
15. Id.; N.C. Aizenman, Latino gang study finds few links to overseas groups, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2007. 
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for Salvadoran youth.16  Over time, MS-13 reportedly relaxed its
membership requirements and began to incorporate anyone that is Latino 
and speaks Spanish.17 
The end of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan civil wars in 1992 and 
1996, respectively, and the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act facilitated the removal of many criminals 
and gang members from the United States.18  These deportees transplanted
the MS-13 and M-18 gangs to Central America.19  Eventually, the gangs
established 112 cells in Honduras, 434 in Guatemala, and 307 in El 
Salvador.20  Although estimates vary considerably, it is believed that there
are approximately 10,500 gang members in El Salvador, 14,000 in
Guatemala, and 36,000 in Honduras.21  In addition, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) estimates that there are 8,000–10,000 MS-13 and 
30,000–50,000 M-18 members in the United States.22 
Recent reports also indicate that other gangs operate in Central America. 
Mao Mao, Máquina, Pandilla 14, Mirada Loca, Muro, and Familia 
Unida are believed to have cells in El Salvador;23 Los Cholos, Los Nicas, 
and Los Batos Locos have cells in Guatemala;24 and Mao Mao, Batos
16. See National Geographic, World’s Most Dangerous Gang (2006), http://channel. 
nationalgeographic.com/series/explorer/2564/Photos#tab-Videos/05520_00 (contains interview 
with Alex Sanchez, an early member of Salvadoran street gangs in Los Angeles).
 17. Daphne Saywer, The Use of Mapping in Analyzing Gang Activity in Fairfax County, 
Virginia, Crime Mapping News 2 (Summer 2004). 
18. THOMAS C. BRUNEAU &RICHARD B. GOETZE, JR., LAS PANDILLAS Y LAS MARAS EN
AMÉRICA CENTRAL, AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL 2 (2008), available at http://www.
airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2008/2tri08/bruneau.htm; see Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, 
110 Stat. 3009-546. 
19. Between 1998–2004, approximately 12,000 and 9,000 criminals were deported 
to El Salvador and Honduras respectively.  Chris Kraul, El Salvador comes to grips with
gangs; Deportees from U.S. feed the violence of groups targeted in public crackdown, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at A1; Chris Kraul, Honduran sees massacre as warning;
President Maduro says the bus attack may have been a message from gangs to back off 
his anti-crime crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A3. 
20. Bruneau & Goetze, Jr., supra note 18, at Table 1.
21. Id. 
22. FBI, THE MS-13 THREAT: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT, Jan. 14, 2008 (reporting
that MS-13 operates in 42 states and the District of Columbia).
23. BRUNEAU & GOETZE, JR., supra note 18, at 3 (estimates of membership in these 
gangs in El Salvador are small.  Mao Mao and Familia Unida are the largest and believed 
to have only thirty members). 
24. Id. at Table 2.
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Locos and Los Rockeros are found in Honduras.25  Generally, there is little 
information available on these gangs. 
B. Structure and Leadership of MS-13 and M-18 
Reports on MS-13 and M-18 do not indicate that the gangs have one 
central leader or top boss.  Instead, the gangs are composed of numerous
vertically organized, cooperative cliques.26  It is believed that there are 
307, 434, and 112 gang cliques in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
respectively.27  Each clique typically consists of thirty to sixty members 
who are charged with maintaining control over a neighborhood.28  The  
clique leader is known as primera palabra (first word).29  Some cliques
may have a second and third leader, respectively dubbed segunda palabra 
and tercera palabra (second word and third word).30  Gang lexicon varies:
for example, some reports refer to leaders as either palabreros or ranflerors.31 
Entry level members of the gang are known as soldados (soldiers). 
However, there are reports that suggest the gangs may have a
sophisticated power structure and a top boss.  A presentation prepared by
Oscar Bonilla, former director of El Salvador’s National Counsel on
Public Security (CNSP)—the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública— 
indicates that there is a multi-tiered level of leadership.32  According to 
Bonilla, leadership begins with neighborhood clique leaders and continues 
hierarchically with municipal leaders, department leaders, leaders for gang 
members outside of prison, prison gang leaders, country leaders, and
ultimately international leaders.33  This information suggests that there is 
25. Id. 
26. These cliques hold meetings and discuss strategies to keep rival gangs out of
their territory. LAURA PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE AND
CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 57–58 (Harvard Univ. Press) (2010). 
27. Bruneau & Goetze, Jr., supra note 18, at Table 1 (however, it is possible that
the estimate of 112 gang cliques in Honduras is incorrect because this same source states 
in the paragraph above that 412 gang cliques existed in Honduras by 1999). 
28. PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 26, at 58. 
29. Id. 
30. DEMOSCOPÍA S.A.,MARAS Y PANDILLAS, COMUNIDAD Y POLICÍA EN CENTROAMÉRICA
47 (2007).
31. MARLON CARRANZA, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN ORGANIZED ARMED VIOLENCE,
DETENTION OR DEATH: WHERE THE “PANDILLERO” KIDS OF EL SALVADOR ARE HEADING 14, 
(2001), http://www.coav.org.br/publique/media/elsalvadoring.pdf (referring to the leader
as palabrero); Robert E. Brenneman, From Homie to Hermano: Conversion and Gang
Exit in Central America 33 (December 2009) (Ph.D dissertation, University of Notre 
Dame) (on file with author) (referring to the leader as ranflero).
32. Aída Luz Santos de Escobar is the current president of the CNSP.  Consejo 
Nacional de Seguridad Pública, http://www.cnsp.gob.sv/index.htm (last visited May 17, 
2011).
33. Each leader reportedly has two trusted friends known in gang slang as chuchos
(dogs). These individuals serve as bodyguards and conduct criminal missions.  Oscar E. 
422
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a separate leader for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
and the United States and Canada.34  A former gang member behind bars
in El Salvador vaguely corroborates this information, stating that MS-13
has a top boss.35 
III. GANG RECRUITMENT, INITIATION, AND DISASSOCIATION
How judges choose to define recruitment will play a central role in the 
asylum claims of current and former gang members.  In the Salvadoran 
theatre, the word recruitment brings to mind the manner in which the 
military forcibly recruited children as young as twelve-years-old and prepared
them to fight in the civil war (1980–1992).36  Children considered fit for
combat were literally taken out of schools, neighborhoods, and soccer fields.37 
With limited exceptions, there are no reports indicating that MS-13 and 
M-18 systematically hand select individuals and force them to become 
gang members.  Nevertheless, a United Nations (U.N.) Guidance Note on
Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs claims that the
gangs “rely heavily on forced recruitment to expand and maintain their 
membership.”38  The U.N. does not support this assertion, despite that 
the Guidance Note leaves the reader to believe that a significant amount 
of individuals are or were gang members against their will.39  This is of
utmost importance given that: 
In UNHCR’s view, voluntary membership in organized gangs normally does
not constitute membership of a particular social group within the meaning of the 
1951 Convention.  Because of the criminal nature of such groups, it would be
Bonilla, Pandillas: Amenaza Transnacional (Jan. 2008) (see slide 16 on structural 
organization), http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2008/CP19439T.ppt#1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
34. Id. 
35. National Geographic, supra note 16. 
36. Iris Mann, ‘Innocent Voices’: Reliving El Salvador’s Civil War, NPR, Oct. 18, 
2005, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4964460. 
37. CLAUDIA RICCA, COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILDREN IN THE
FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) AND THE ARMED FORCES OF
EL SALVADOR (FAES) 5 (July 2006). 
38. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidance Note on Refugee 
Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www. 
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bb21fa02.html. 
39. References to forced recruitment are unsupported by research.  At no time does 
the U.N. source these claims by providing direct reference to primary or secondary
sources or expert testimony. See id. 
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inconsistent with human rights and other underlying humanitarian principles of
the 1951 Convention to consider such affiliation as a protected characteristic.40 
Per the U.N. Guidance Note, current and former gang members who joined
the gang voluntarily should not receive protection benefits in the United 
States irrespective of whether “former membership in a gang” constitutes a
particular social group.  Thus, it is extremely important to understand how 
gangs acquire new members.  A close look at country conditions reports 
does not support the U.N.’s assertion of forced recruitment.41  Rather, an 
overwhelming amount of Central American youth is “at-risk” of joining
gangs. 
Generally accepted risk factors associated with gang membership include, 
but are not limited to: conditions of poverty, family disintegration or 
separation, neglect, violent domestic environments, unemployment, scarcity
of educational and developmental opportunities, and family membership
in gangs.42  The presence of one or more of these factors may compel an 
adolescent or child to turn to gangs in hope of finding a familial environment,
social status, and economic opportunities. Thus, it is believed that incentives 
for gang membership will remain strong in the absence of significant 
improvements in socioeconomic conditions.43 
A. Risk Factors Associated With Gang Membership in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras 
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
gangs in El Salvador offer social acceptance and alternative means to
acquire otherwise unobtainable goods.44 Social acceptance is an effective
lure for adolescents with low levels of education and who come from 
impoverished and broken families.45  The breakdown of the Salvadoran
family structure is a result of the civil war, the weak economy, and migration.
The war killed 75,000 people and at least 1,000,000 became refugees or
40. Id. at 15.
41. Gang expert Thomas Boerman writes, “It is commonly agreed that the vast
majority of gang-joining is voluntary, and according to experts I consulted while in El 
Salvador recently the percentage of the youth population subjected to forced recruitment 
is not likely to be more than five percent.”  Thomas Boerman, Youth Gangs in El 
Salvador: Unpacking the State Department 2007 Issue Paper, IMMIGRATION DAILY, 
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2010,1117-boerman.shtm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
42. DEMOSCOPÍA S.A., supra note 30, at 61–67. 
43. Latin America Politics: Anti-gang warfare, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 
Dec. 27, 2007. 
44. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. [USAID], CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG
ASSESSMENT, ANNEX 1: EL SALVADOR PROFILE (2006) [hereinafter EL SALVADOR PROFILE].
45. See OSCAR E. BONILLA, EL SALVADOR Y LAS PANDILLAS (Consejo Nacional de
Seguridad Pública) (El Sal.). 
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internally displaced persons, with the majority seeking refuge in the United 
States.46  Many of these people were separated from their families for 
extended periods of time because they were unable to obtain permanent
immigration status in the United States.47  The family structure continues
to suffer from the war’s less measurable effect on the mental health of
countless victims of extreme violence, persecution, and human rights
abuses.48  Today’s economy, which boasts a poverty rate as high as 40%,
forces approximately 70,000 people to leave El Salvador annually to work 
abroad and send remittance money to their family members who remain
behind.49  The resulting family separation often leaves children, who drop
out of school at an alarming rate, under the care of a relative, resulting in 
child abandonment, neglect, and the need for social acceptance.50 
Similarly, gangs have flourished in Guatemala because there is an
abundance of youth with low levels of education that come from
impoverished and broken families.  According to USAID, only 1% of 
children enrolled in primary school finish secondary school.51  Reports
 46. Andrea Kathryn Talentino, El Salvador, in  THE COST OF CONFLICT: PREVENTION
AND CURE IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 199–200 (Michael E. Brown & Richard N. Rosecrance 
eds., 1999).
47. In American Baptist Churches v. Thornburg, Guatemalans and Salvadorans
filed a class action law suit against the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS,
now U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services), the Executive Office for Immigration
Review and the Department of State, alleging discriminatory treatment of asylum claims 
in the adjudication of their asylum claims.  760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The
parties eventually reached a settlement entitling members of the class to a de novo
adjudication of their asylum claims.  U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, American 
Baptist Churches v. Thornburg (ABC) Settlement Agreement, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow path Laws > Settlement Agreements). 
48. See Igancio Martín Baró et al., PSICOLOGÍA SOCIAL DE LA GUERRA: TRAUMA Y
TERAPIA, (Universidad Centroamericana, 1990). 
 49. Philippe Revelli, Pandillas Violentas en El Salvador, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE,
EDICIÓN CONO SUR, Mar. 2004 (Arg.). In 2008, Salvadorans working abroad remitted 
$3.8 billion.  At approximately 17%, remittances are the country’s largest source of gross 
domestic product.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,
BACKGROUND NOTE: EL SALVADOR (2010).
50. BONILLA, supra note 45 (stating that most gang members in El Salvador do not
finish secondary school, and 80% come from dysfunctional families).  Furthermore, it is 
reported that 40% of children drop out of school before fifth grade and 70% of children 
age 16–17 do not have access to education.  EL SALVADOR PROFILE, supra note 44; 
UNICEF, AT A GLANCE: EL SALVADOR, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/elsalvador.
html (last visited May 17, 2011). 
51. 90% of Guatemalan primary schools are government funded.  In contrast, 80% 
of secondary schools are private and inaccessible to the poor. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L 
DEV. [USAID], CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT, ANNEX 2: GUATEMALA 
PROFILE (2006) [hereinafter GUATEMALA PROFILE].
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indicate that approximately 90% of gang members come from disintegrated 
families.52  The Guatemalan civil war (1960–1996), which left over 200,000 
dead or missing and displaced as many as 1,500,000 people, destroyed
and separated families.53  The family continues to suffer today as thousands
are forced to flee each year principally due to conditions of poverty.
Sources estimate that approximately 56% live in poverty and 15% live in
conditions of extreme poverty.54  Between 6,000 and 12,000 new Guatemalan
migrants arrive in the United States each year.55  The inability of migrants to
obtain lawful immigration status prior to their departure from Guatemala or
shortly after their arrival forces them to separate from their families.  As 
a result, large numbers of youth turn to gangs to fill the void.56 
Lastly, Honduras demonstrates that a relatively recent armed conflict
is not a precondition necessary to gang proliferation.  Gangs have taken 
root in Honduras due to conditions of poverty, lack of opportunities, and
family separation.  Family separation began in the 1980s, a time when 
Honduras was considered a repressive society, human rights abuses were
common, and the detention and disappearance of leftists was not
uncommon.57  Family separation continues to date because 71% of
Hondurans live in conditions of poverty and the country suffers from urban 
overpopulation, rural underdevelopment, and natural disasters.58  These
conditions force families to separate and children are frequently left to
the care of a relative.59  The Honduran government offers few educational 
opportunities, skills training, recreation and sports activities, and artistic 
and cultural activities to its youth.60  Due to these conditions, youths turn 
52. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 65. 
53. GUATEMALAN COMM’N FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, GUATEMALA: MEMORY 
OF SILENCE (1999), http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2010) (click “The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation;” see paragraphs 2 and 66). 
54. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: GUATEMALA (2010),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2010). The World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less
than $1.25 per day. World Bank Updates Poverty Estimates for the Developing World, 
Aug. 26, 2008.
55. In addition, approximately 60,000 and 2,500 Guatemalans are deported
annually from Mexico and the United States, respectively.  JAMES SMITH, GUATEMALA:
ECONOMIC IMMIGRANTS REPLACE POLITICAL REFUGEES, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Apr.
2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org. 
56. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51. 
57. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. [USAID], CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG
ASSESSMENT, ANNEX 3: HONDURAS PROFILE (2006) [hereinafter HONDURAS PROFILE];
WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM, A RESOURCE 
GUIDE (2008).
58. HONDURAS PROFILE, supra note 57; WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., supra note 
57. 
59. HONDURAS PROFILE, supra note 57. 
60. Id. 
426
FOGELBACH ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:45 PM     
 
























      
 
     
  
     
     
 
    
 
 
[VOL. 12:  417, 2011] Gangs, Violence, and Victims 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
to gangs, who offer a welfare structure, protection, a social and substitute 
family network, and a source of livelihood.61 
Available information does not indicate that gangs selectively recruit 
adolescents on account of their actual or imputed race, religion, political
opinion, or sexual orientation.  According to sociologist Maria Santacruz 
Giralt, gang violence is fundamentally aimed at destroying their perceived 
enemies, which she describes as similarly situated youth who only differ
in what gang they belong to.62  The conflict is completely irrational, lacking 
a racial, religious, or ideological basis.63  Furthermore, there are no reports
that indicate that gangs particularly recruit members of indigenous 
communities.  To the contrary, indigenous communities in Guatemala
have at times captured, “prosecuted,” and sentenced gang members 
to forced labor in accordance with their customs.64  Thus, the general
consensus is that forced or deliberate recruitment is unnecessary.65
 61. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
ISSUE PAPER: YOUTH GANG ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS (2006) [hereinafter YOUTH
GANG ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS].
62. Revelli, supra note 49. 
63. Id. There are no reports indicating that gangs target racial minorities for 
“recruitment.” Guatemala has a large indigenous population estimated at 40%. In
contrast, only 7% and 1% of the population in Honduras and El Salvador, respectively,
are categorized as indigenous.  Honduras’ Afro minority accounts for 2% of the 
population.  Furthermore, race in these countries is not a clearly identifiable concept. 
Although a country like El Salvador claims that only 1% of its people are indigenous, 
90% of Salvadorans, including gang members and victims, are of mixed indigenous 
ancestry and categorized as Mestizo.  White European descendants only account for nine 
and 1% of the population in El Salvador and Honduras, respectively.  CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, & HONDURAS 
(2010), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
gt.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
64. See EFE, Indígenas en Guatemala “condenan” a 20 pandilleros a trabajos
forzados, PANAMÁ AMÉRICA (Dec. 28, 2008), http://www.pa-digital.com.pa/periodico/
edicion-anterior/nacion-interna.php?story_id=730072. 
65. See EL SALVADOR PROFILE, supra note 44, at 50; See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L 
DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT, ANNEX 1: EL SALVADOR
PROFILE 50 (2006) [hereinafter EL SALVADOR PROFILE]. See DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra
note 30, at 17; See YOUTH GANG ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS, supra note 61, at 4. See
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, ISSUE 
PAPER: YOUTH GANG ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS 4 (2006) [hereinafter YOUTH GANG 
ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS].
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B. Why We Joined: Information Provided by Three     
Former Members of MS-1366 
In-depth interviews with three former gang members bring to life the 
factors that put Central American youth at risk of joining gangs.  These
three former members—anonymously identified as B.A., J.D., and M.A. 
—joined different cells of MS-13 in El Salvador in 1995 and 1996.67 
Although they remained members of the gang as recently as 2005, it is 
possible that their experiences significantly differ from today’s youth. 
That is to say, forced recruitment may occur today despite that it is 
unfounded and unsupported by publicly available reports. 
B.A. stated that he voluntarily joined MS-13 when he was sixteen-
years-old.  He is illiterate and never received formal education.  Around 
1996, a deportee from the United States returned to El Salvador and
frequented B.A.’s town.  The deportee, who was Americanized and therefore
admired by local youth, offered B.A. and other children money and
clothes. B.A. explained that this was an effective lure because he tended
cattle in exchange for 12 Colones per day (approximately $1.50).  Although
B.A. was one of seven children, he was the only one in his family to join
a gang. When asked what would have kept him out of gangs as a teen, 
B.A. stated, “A job.” 
J.D. joined MS-13 when he was just thirteen-years-old.  Despite joining 
at such an early age, J.D. went on to complete high school and worked in
pharmaceutical sales for two years.  Upon further inquiry, J.D. revealed
that his father was killed in the Salvadoran civil war when he was just
seven-years-old.  The following year, his mother migrated to the United 
States and left him under the custody and care of his grandparents along
with eight other grandchildren.  He explained that this led to feelings of 
abandonment and neglect.  Several of his childhood friends with whom 
he played soccer had already joined the gang. He felt that this provided 
his friends with greater standing among females, something he described 
as “very important” when you are fourteen or fifteen-years-old.
Lastly, M.A. joined the gang at the ripe age of twenty-two.  He stated 
that he only has a fourth grade education and served in the military for 
two years during the Salvadoran civil war.  M.A. stated that he never
enjoyed school, where he often fought with other children.  He enjoyed 
military combat, but left the military after the civil war ended because he
66. The information contained in this section was gathered through field research
conducted by the author.  Field Research, Sept. 2010. 
67. B.A. joined MS-13 in Cantón Guascate in Ahuachapán Department in 1996. 
J.D. joined the MS-13 clique “Sailors Locos Salvatrucha Westside” in Cantón El Niño in 
San Miguel Department in 1996.  M.A. joined the MS-13 clique “San Luises Locos 
Salvatruchas” in San Luis Talpa, La Paz Department in 1995. 
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was assigned to plant trees, something he described as boring.  He said
he voluntarily joined the gang, stating, “The devil took hold of me.” 
When asked to explain, M.A. stated, “You know, sometimes you just go 
down the wrong path.”
C. Three Exceptions to Voluntary Association 
A look at publicly available information of gangs allows for the
identification of three possible exceptions to voluntary association.
Although the vast majority of information concludes that most people 
join gangs voluntarily, it does not exclude the possibility of forced
recruitment.  This may be the case for the most vulnerable individuals, 
including those in gang controlled neighborhoods, prison facilities, and
at-risk children immune from criminal prosecution. 
1. Gang Controlled Neighborhoods 
Publicly available reports indicate that gang recruitment has spread
from the disillusioned poor to children from good homes who are too 
afraid to remain unaffiliated.68  “There is a saying in some El Salvadoran
neighborhoods . . . if you’re not in a gang, then you’re against gangs.”69 
Recruitment of “children from good homes” does not necessarily indicate
that gang recruitment has spread to the small middle and upper classes. 
Rather, it means that good children in gang controlled neighborhoods
may be susceptible to repeated harm and recruitment efforts by the gangs.
Although observers do not specify the neighborhoods where this may
occur, there have been attempts to gather this information. 
Research compiled by the Comisión Salvadoreña Antidrogas (COSA)— 
the Salvadoran Antidrug Commission—provides information on gang 
controlled neighborhoods by municipality.70  For example, in Aguilares 
68. Andrew Glazer, Los Angeles summit Wednesday seeks to stop spread of gangs 




70. COSA is an office within El Salvador’s Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security.  Research was conducted over three months in 262 municipalities and
throughout all fourteen departments. See COMISIÓN SALVADOREÑA ANTIDROGAS, DROGAS Y
DELITOS CONEXOS: MARAS, INICIATIVAS LOCALES DE PREVENCIÓN, http://www.seguridad. 
gob.sv/observatorio/Iniciativas%20Locales/WEB/Generales/objetivos.htm (last visited
May 17, 2011). 
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municipality in San Salvador Department, it is reported that M-18 is
present in the neighborhoods San José, Las Pampas, Las Tres Campanas, 
and Los Palacios. In the same municipality, MS-13 is present in the
neighborhoods Las Pampitas, Mangos, Santa Eugenia, Girón, Barrio El 
Calvario, Cantón El Piñalito, and Caserío El Chorizo.71  Assessments of
other municipalities are not as precise, yet provide other useful information.
For example, in San Luis Talpa, La Paz Department, the report states
that there are gangs present and that anti-gang initiatives have been
ineffective in reducing their presence.72  According to locals, there are 
sectors controlled by the gangs where the police do not patrol.73 
2. Detention Centers 
A second exception to voluntary association may occur in detention 
centers or prisons.  A negative side effect of anti-gang legislation has been
greater prison overcrowding, which provides fertile ground for further
recruitment and communication between members of different gang cliques.74 
For example, El Salvador has nineteen penitentiaries with a total inmate
population of 24,051.75  However, the prison capacity is only 8,000.76 Of 
the total inmate population, 15,721 are convicted criminals, and the
remaining 8,330 are in criminal proceedings.77  USAID reports that pre-
trial detention centers are often in worse conditions than the prisons and 
present recruitment opportunities for gangs and elements of organized
crime.78  For example, some current and former gang members explain that
they joined a gang in prison in exchange for protection from other prisoners.79 
71. See COMISIÓN SALVADOREÑA ANTIDROGAS, DROGAS Y DELITOS CONEXOS:
MARAS, INICIATIVAS LOCALES DE PREVENCIÓN, MUNICIPIO DE AGUILARES, DEPARTAMENTO DE 
SAN SALVADOR, http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/observatorio/Iniciativas%20Locales/WEB/
San%20Salvador/aguilares.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2011). 
72. See COMISIÓN SALVADOREÑA ANTIDROGAS, DROGAS Y DELITOS CONEXOS:
MARAS, INICIATIVAS LOCALES DE PREVENCIÓN, MUNICIPIO DE SANLUIS TALPA,DEPARTAMENTO
DE LA PAZ, http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/observatorio/Iniciativas%20Locales/WEB/La%20 
Paz/snluistalpa.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2011). 
73. According to a map provided by the research group, gangs are present near the 
intersection of the Comalapa and Cacapa rivers.  Across the Comalapa River, there are
reports of weapons and drug trafficking. See id.
 74. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 43. 
75. See Magdalena Flores, Aplican medidas más drásticas en centros penales, 





78. See GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51, at 76. 
79. See YOUTH GANG ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS, supra note 61, at 4.
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3. The Recruitment of Children Immune from Criminal Prosecution 
The third exception involves the recruitment of children.80  According 
to several sources, gangs recruit children less than twelve-years-old because 
they are too young to face legal charges.81  Under El Salvador’s Ley del
Menor Infractor (Juvenile Offenders Law) and Honduras’ Código de la 
Niñez y Adolescencia (Childhood and Adolescence Code), children less 
than twelve-years-old are presumed incapable of infringing penal law.82 
Guatemala’s Ley de Protección Integral de Niñez y Adolescencia 
(Comprehensive Childhood and Adolescence Protection Law) provides 
the same protection for children less than thirteen-years-old.83 
80. Because adolescents account for a significant number, if not the majority of
members of street gangs, the word “children” exclusively refers to individuals up to age 
12. 
81. In El Salvador, it has been reported that gangs recruit children as young as 
eight years of age.  Niños en la mira de pandillas, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), July 19,
2008. The recruitment of children in El Salvador is corroborated by the National Public 
Security Council (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública). Eric Lemus, El Salvador: 
Hungry for members, gangs recruit children, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 28, 2008, 
available at Factiva, Doc. No. IPRS000020080331e43v0000e. According to security
analyst Mario Mérida, gangs in Guatemala recruit children as young as eleven years old 
in an effort to replicate their Salvadoran counterparts.  Mariela Castañon, Delincuencia
pone los ojos en la niñez, LA HORA (Guat.), Sep. 29, 2008, http://www.lahora.com.gt/notas. 
php?key=37418&fch=2008-09-29. There are few sources available indicating that 
Honduran children beneath the age of twelve are recruited by gangs.  Nevertheless, the 
Honduran ambassador to the United States has provided congressional testimony
affirming that gangs recruit kids between the ages of eight and fourteen.  Violence in
Central America: Briefing and Hearing before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of 
the Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras). The U.S. Department of State corroborates these 
findings, stating that, “gangs appear to favor increasingly the recruitment of children,
some as young as eight or nine years old. . . . Children are sometimes brought into the 
gang structure through getting them hooked on drugs and thereby transforming them into 
addicts dependent on the gang.” YOUTH GANG ORGANIZATIONS IN HONDURAS, supra
note 61, at 3–4. 
82. Decreto No. 863, 27 April 1994, Ley del Menor Infractor [Juvenile Offenders 
Law] art. 2, DIARIO OFICIAL, tomo. 323, no. 106, 8 June 1994 (El Sal.); Decreto No. 73-
96, 30 May 1996, Codigo de la Niñez y la Adolescencia [Childhood and Adolescence 
Code] art.180, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL, num. 28,053, 5 Sept. 1996 (Hond.).  El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are signatories of the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Article 40 of the Convention requires signatories to establish an age below 
which children shall be presumed incapable of infringing penal law. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
83. Decreto No. 27-2003,4 June 2003, Ley de Protección Integral de Niñez y
Adolescencia [Comprehensive Childhood and Adolescence Protection Law] art. 138, 
DIARIO DE CENTRO AMÉRICA, tomo. CCLXXII, no. 13, 18 July 2003 (Guat.). 
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Reports indicate that street children are particularly vulnerable to gang 
recruitment.  A focus group in El Salvador reports that gangs take children
off the streets, clean them up, and improve their standard of living.84 
Leonel Dubón, director of Casa Alianza in Guatemala, states that the
number of street children declined from 5,000 to 800 from 2007–2008 
because they were recruited by members of organized crime.85 Gangs 
also operate in and around schools.  It is believed that there are approximately
eight to ten child gang members at 536 out of the 1,021 schools in El 
Salvador.86 Gangs also demand monetary payments from schools and
threaten and harass the students.87 
In extreme cases, gangs may sexually exploit young girls and force 
children to rob or kill.88  Typically, however, it is believed that gangs
may coerce, intimidate, or force children to deliver messages; stand as
lookouts; and distribute drugs, weapons, and liquor.89  For example, 
Adonai, an eight-year-old from the Soyapango neighborhood in San 
Salvador, states that gang members shot one of his friends because he did
not want to collaborate with the gang.90 Adonai now delivers messages
for the gang in exchange for 25 cents.91  Similarly, a thirteen-year-old
girl states that gangs remove children from school buses, threaten to kill 
and rape their families, and force them to commit robberies and homicides.92 
The use of children in El Salvador has become prevalent enough to 
prompt the National Republican Alliance (ARENA) to propose an 
amendment to Article 30 of the Penal Code.93  This amendment would 
make the use of minors an aggravating circumstance to a crime.94 
Similarly, the PDC proposed a law that would make the recruitment of 
84. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A.,supra note 30, at 58. 
85. Denuncian reclutamiento de niños para delinquir en Guatemala, EL 
ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Nov. 30, 2008, www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/articulo
94848-denuncian-reclutamiento-de-ninos-delinquir-guatemala. 
86. Niños en la mira de pandillas, supra note 81. 
87. Castañon, supra note 81. 
88. Denuncian reclutamiento de niños para delinquir en Guatemala, supra note 
85. 
89. Gangs refer to kids as mascotitas (“little pets”) or haynitas (“little girlfriends”).  
Niños en la mira de pandillas, supra note 81. 
90. Lemus, supra note 81. 
91. Id. 
92. Niños salvadoreños denuncian en la ONU a las pandillas, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 6, 2009. 
93. Amilcar Mejía, ARENA y PDC piden penalizar a quien utilice a menores en
delitos, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.), Feb. 16, 2010, http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-
salvador/politica/93915-arena-y-pdc-piden-penalizar-a-quien-utilice-a-menores-en-delitos.
html. See generally Código Penal art. 30 (El Sal.). 
94. Mejía, supra note 93. 
432
FOGELBACH ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:45 PM     
 



























[VOL. 12:  417, 2011] Gangs, Violence, and Victims 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
children into criminal organizations punishable by ten to fifteen years in
prison.95 
Based on the foregoing, special attention and consideration should be
given to protection claims filed by children age twelve or younger.
D. Initiation Rites for Males, Females, and Children 
Initiation is the process by which one officially becomes a member of 
a gang. Typically, prospective members must submit to an initiation rite 
and complete an initiation mission.  The mission usually involves criminal
activity and may be committed during a probationary period at the
inception of membership. 
The traditional initiation rite is known as the “jump-in.”  The jump-in 
requires a new member to submit to a gang beating allegedly lasting thirteen
and eighteen seconds in the case of MS-13 and M-18, respectively.96 
The jump-in typically applies to adolescent males; females may opt to be
jumped-in to the gang.97 Females may alternatively enter the gang by 
submitting to a heinous rite known as “the train.”98  The train requires a
female to successively engage in sex with as many as thirteen or all members
of the gang.  This notorious rite is physically devastating, sometimes leaving
females bloody and unconscious.99  It is believed that women who are
initiated in this manner are assigned a lower status within the gang than 
women who are physically beaten or jumped-in to the gang.100 
In contrast to adolescents, observers note that children are not required 
to submit to the jump-in or the train.101  It is believed that these initiation 
rites may deter children from collaborating with the gangs.  There is no 
precise age which automatically exempts a child from an initiation rite. 
95. Id.
 96. DEMOSCOPÍA S.A., supra note 30, at 29; Lemus, supra note 81. The three gang
members interviewed corroborated these claims, stating that they were each required to 
submit to a gang beating by three or four members. 
97. See DEMOSCOPÍA S.A., supra note 30, at 38. 
98. PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 26, at 84. 
99. Id. at 77. 
100. Id. at 84. 
101. See Lemus, supra note 81. 
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E. Initiation Missions 
Once initiated, gang members are subject to a probationary period 
generally lasting two months in the case of both MS-13 and M-18.102 
During probation, new members may be required to complete a “mission” 
to confirm their loyalty to the gang and cement their status as members.
Missions typically involve criminal activity. 
Violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is often the result 
of gang initiation.103  Frequently, the cost of admission is the murder of a
nominated person, typically a member of a rival gang, but sometimes a 
person at random.104  For example, an individual may enter the gang by
killing three members of a rival gang.105  Females are not exempt from
missions. For example, a nineteen-year-old female states that when she
joined the gang, she accompanied other members of her gang to kill a 
taxi driver who was supposedly a member of a rival gang.106  Less 
information on initiation missions involving children is available. 
However, a thirteen-year-old girl in El Salvador states that gangs force 
children to commit robberies and homicides.107  Aside from homicide, 
initiation missions may involve assault, robbery, or extortion.108 
Empirical data indicates that most gang members are required to 
complete an initiation mission. For example, 72%, 25%, and 52% of
MS-13 members in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, respectively, 
stated that they completed a mission when they entered the gang.109  Although
the data does not provide further detail, 46% of MS-13 members in 
Guatemala specified that their mission involved an act of violence or 
murder.110  It is also notable to mention that 28% of M-18 members in
Honduras and 50% of M-18 members in El Salvador and Guatemala 
stated that they did not complete a mission to join the gang.111
 102. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 32. MS-13 members in Guatemala and 
Honduras, however, are reportedly subject to probationary periods lasting seven months 
and one month, respectively. Id.
 103. Anne Barbeliuk, Gang Fears Death Awaits Ruth if She Returns Home, Says 
Teacher Ruth Death Target Fear, HOBART MERCURY (Austl.), Oct. 23, 2003. 
104. Id.
 105. PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 26, at 76. 
106. Id. See also DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 38 (stating women must
commit an act of violence to gain admission to the gang). 
107. Niños salvadoreños denuncian en la ONU a las pandillas, supra note 92. 
108. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 28. 
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F. Disassociation 
Available information implies that the term “former gang member” is
misleading and inaccurate.112  In gang jargon, the term “calmado” or 
“calmada” is used to refer to a member who is basically inactive, but has 
not left the gang.113  Gang leaders report that an active member may become
calmado or calmada if: (1) he or she experiences a bona fide religious
transformation; (2) a male marries and has children, or a female becomes
pregnant; or (3) he or she wishes to dedicate his or herself to their 
employment to support their family.114 An active member’s request to 
become calmado or calmada must be genuine; those who use religious
transformation, for example, as pretext to leave the gang may be susceptible
to serious harm, including death.115 
Gang leaders decide who will—and will not—become a calmado or 
calmada. According to a gang leader in Guatemala, it is not impossible 
to get out of a gang. A member who wishes to leave the gang must
follow protocol and have his or her “paperwork” ready.116  The paperwork
refers to the member’s track record within the gang which entails having
killed someone and done things on behalf of the gang.117  Gang leaders
evaluate the individual’s record to decide whether he or she deserves to 
be released from the gang.118  For example, a former gang member
interviewed in 2008 states that she sought permission from the gang to
112. Lorena Cuervo Clavel, a social anthropologist that has worked with gangs for
over ten years, explains that, in practice, a gang member never ceases to belong to the 
gang, but may, in rare circumstances become inactive.  PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., supra
note 26, at 79. 
113. Lemus, supra note 81.  One popular example involves Alex Sanchez, a former 
member of MS-13 and asylee in the United States who helped set up Homies Unidos, a 
gang prevention and fund raising group with offices in Los Angeles and San Salvador. 
Sanchez was recently arrested on conspiracy murder charges and released on $2,000,000 
bail.  According to some sources, Sanchez is not a former member, but rather a 
“calmado” who never really left the gang.  Thomas Watkins, Feds arrest head of anti-
gang group in Los Angeles, ASSOCIATED PRESS ARCHIVES, June 25, 2009; Christina 
Hoag, L.A. anti-gang activist granted $2M bail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 13, 2010. 
114. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 96. A State Department report identifies 
religious conversion, marriage, military enlistment and enrollment in a substance abuse
program as the few options available for members who wish to leave the gang.  U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, ISSUE PAPER:
YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS IN EL SALVADOR 6–7 (2007).









































become a calmada because she was pregnant and joined an evangelical
church.119  Without their permission, she states, she would not have been
able to get out of the gang.120  Members who leave without permission are
considered traitors, and according to gang norms, all cliques are notified 
and have the “green light” to kill them.121 
Empirical data published in 2007 suggests that most gang members 
may become inactive—or calmados—without fear of retribution.  According
to a poll of former gang members, 89%, 79%, and 63% of M-18 members, 
and 55%, 32%, and 66% of MS-13 members in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras, respectively, stated that nothing prevented or impeded
their departure from the gang.122  The same study reveals that 83%, 76%, 
and 88% of female members and 69%, 68%, and 65% of male members in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, respectively, did not face obstacles 
or impediments related to disassociation.123  The most commonly reported
obstacles to disassociation are death and fear of reprisals.124  However, it 
is unclear whether those who fear death believe they will be killed by 
members of their former gang who now perceive them as traitors, members
of the rival gang who still perceive them as enemies, clandestine actors 
who perceive them as a social disease, or the state.125 
A competing report on gangs in El Salvador highlights the testimonies 
of current and former gang members who express a fear of death.  The 
report states, “Whereas in the past it was difficult, but feasible for a gang 
member to disassociate safely from a gang, in recent years it has become
virtually impossible to do so.”126  One former gang member told the
research group in August 2006 that, “Right now the only way to leave 
the gang is to die.  They tell you that if you find God you can leave, but 
even then they still kill you.”127  Another current gang member who has
been trying to leave the gang for six years states that members of his
clique go to his house to collect rent and threaten to kill him.128  In  
essence, his clique treats him like those members of the general public
who are forced to make extortion payments at the threat of death. 
119. Due to safety concerns, the “calmada” offering this testimony referred to
herself by the pseudonym “Fénix.” Lemus, supra note 81. 
120. Id.
 121. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 96. 
122. Literally translated, gang members report that there are no impediments to 
disassociation.  Figuratively, this means that there are no dangers that prevent them from 
leaving the gang. Id. at 33. 
123. Id. at 97. 
124. Id.
125. Id.
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G. How We Disassociated: Information Provided by Three          
Former Members of MS-13 
B.A., J.D., and M.A. corroborated that members were able to leave 
MS-13 without harm as recently as 2005.  B.A. stated that he left the gang 
in 2002 by moving from Cantón Guascate to Santa Ana, and then to 
Chalatenango. Although he remained in El Salvador until 2010, he did 
not experience any harm.  J.D. stated that he left the gang when he migrated
to the United States in 2003.  He told his gang leaders that he was 
leaving for the United States and they offered to network him with gang
members in Los Angeles, California.  J.D. ultimately resettled in Texas 
and claims he no longer has ties to the gang.  Lastly, M.A. stated that he
left the gang after he became a Christian in 2005.  Members of his former
gang, however, severely beat him when they became aware that M.A.
continued to use drugs.  After the beating, M.A. returned to church and 
had no further problems with the gang.
IV. GANGS AND VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA,
AND HONDURAS
Gangs contribute to the generally high levels of social violence in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  While gangs are disproportionately 
blamed for crime, they have and continue to engage in serious criminal 
activity that terrorizes and paralyzes society.  The most publicized crimes 
are homicides and extortion and there are now reports that gangs collaborate 
with Mexican drug cartels that have spilled over into Central America as
a result of the United States and Mexico’s war on drugs and organized
crime known as the Mérida Initiative.129 
A. Massacres, Bus Burnings, and Extortions 
Two separate violent massacres reportedly committed by gangs occurred 
in Honduras and El Salvador.  On December 23, 2004, gang members in
129. Although the Initiative also includes Central America, the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti, Mexico is the primary recipient of U.S. funds.  From 2008–2010, Congress 
has extended $1.15 billion to Mexico to combat organized crime and drug trafficking.  In
the same time frame, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti have only 
been allotted $275 million.  U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement, The Merida Initiative, June 23, 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
fs/122397.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
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San Pedro Sula, Honduras boarded a bus transporting passengers on their 
way home from a day of Christmas shopping.130  The gang opened fire
on the passengers, killing twenty-eight, including six children.131  In June  
2010, gang members in the San Salvador suburb of Mejicanos boarded a 
bus, locked the passengers inside, and burned them alive, killing fourteen.132 
In a separate bus attack later that day, two more people were killed.133 
Bus burnings and the killing of bus drivers and fee collectors have 
become increasingly common in recent years.  For example, in January 
2010, three supposed gang members armed with guns approached a bus, 
doused it with gasoline, and lit it on fire.134  The police responded and
were able to extinguish the flame, but the perpetrators escaped.135 
Similarly, supposed gang members boarded and torched a bus on the 
outskirts of Guatemala City.136  Twenty passengers and the driver were
able to escape uninjured.137 It is reported that gangs burn buses and kill 
drivers and fee collectors in order to compel bus owners to make extortion 
payments.138  In Guatemala, gangs charge each bus 100 Quetzales ($13.10) 
per day.  These relatively small collections amount to large amounts of 
money over time.  For example, it is estimated that El Salvador’s public
transportation sector lost $18 million in 2009 as a result of extortions.139 
Extortions also affect the overall economy.  Micro-entrepreneurs, including 
street vendors and market dealers, and small to medium-sized businesses 
are also heavily affected by extortions.140  In 2009, approximately 900 
small to medium businesses shut down due to criminal activity in San 
Miguel, El Salvador.141  Individuals who set up a business are subject to 
extortion demands shortly thereafter because criminal groups perceive them
 130. Chris Kraul, Honduras sees massacre as warning; President Maduro says the
bus attack may have been a message from gangs to back off his anti-crime crackdown, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004. 
131. The World; Honduras arrests two more suspects; About 2,000 soldiers comb 
the slums near San Pedro Sula for the gunmen who ambushed a bus.  Families bury
some of the 28 victims, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 2004. 
132. See infra at 1.
133. Id.
 134. Carlos A. Torres, Buseros evitan que maras quemen bus, EL DIARIO DE HOY
(El Sal.), Jan. 8, 2010. 
135. Id. 
136. Pandilleros queman bus para exigir extorsión en Guatemala, RADIO LA 
PRIMERÍSIMA (Guat.), Mar. 21, 2009. 
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. This estimate was provided by Catalino Miranda, president of the National 
Federation of Transport Workers.  Diego Méndez, Gang members burn bus, kill 14, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2010. 
140. Amadeo Cabrero, Comercio el más afectado por extorsión en 2010, LA 
PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.), Mar. 18, 2010. 
141. Id.
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to have money and lack protection.  Within the context of these well
organized extortion rings, failure to pay is a death sentence.142 
According to the El Salvador’s Attorney General’s Office—the Fiscalía 
General de la República—78% of extortions originate with a phone call 
made from a prison facility.143  The authorities have been unable to
control the flow of cellular telephones to prison inmates.  In 2010 alone, 
2,652 cell phones were confiscated from inmates in El Salvador’s prisons.144 
Perhaps more absurd is the fact that inmates are able to recharge their
cell phone batteries from electrical outlets available in their holding rooms.145 
Consequently, there have been 3,560 known cases of extortion from 
January to November 2010, with the departments of San Salvador, San
Miguel, La Libertad, and Sonsonate reporting the most cases.146 
B. Homicides 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have also been plagued with
high levels of deadly violence since the mid-1990s.  For example, 
between 1994 and 1998, there were 33,658 homicides in El Salvador.147 
From 1995–1999, Guatemala registered 16,842 homicides.148  In the same 
time frame, Honduras suffered approximately 12,000 homicides.149 Gangs
142. In the first three months of 2009, fifty bus drivers and fee collectors had been
killed in Guatemala.  In El Salvador, 137 bus drivers and fee collectors were killed in
2009. Pandilleros queman bus para exigir extorsión en Guatemala, supra note 136; 
Torres, supra note 134. 
143. Fernando Romero & Amadeo Cabrera, Extorsiones no paran de salir de
centros penales, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.), Nov. 18, 2010. 
144. Inmates at the maximum security prison in Izalco do not have access to
electrical outlets.  There are no reported extortions originating from the Izalco facility. 
The Attorney General’s Office has suggested that this measure should be applied to other
facilities. Id.
145. In some instances, inmates use lamps to recharge their phones.  Id.
146. As of November 15, 2010, there have been 673 reported extortions in San 
Salvador, 341 in San Miguel, 269 in La Libertad, 220 in Sonsonate, 161 in La Paz, 145 
in Santa Ana, 139 in Ahuachapán, 115 in Usulután, 89 in La Unión, 58 in San Vicente, 
54 in Morazán, 51 in each Cabañas and Cuscatlán, and 26 in Chalatenango.  Id. 
147. This is an average of 6,714 homicides per year.  JOSÉ MIGUEL CRUZ ET AL.,
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VIOLENT CRIME IN EL SALVADOR
18 (IUDOP-Universidad Centroamericana 1999). 
148. ARTURO MATUTE RODRÍGUEZ & IVÁN GARCÍA SANTIAGO, U.N. DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM [UNDP], INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DE LA VIOLENCIA EN GUATEMALA 19 (2007). 
149. See Agustín Lagos, De 2000 a 2008 se reportan 28,000 homicidios, EL 
HERALDO (Hon.) (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.elheraldo.hn/Sucesos/Ediciones/2009/ 
03/17/Noticias/De-2000-a-2008-se-reportan-28-000-homicidios  (reporting an average of 
6.55 homicides per day from 1995–1999, resulting in 11,954 total homicides). 
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took root in these societies amidst these high levels of violence.
Consequently, homicidal violence in the region has remained at suffocating
levels.150  In 2009, there were 4,365, 6,500, and 5,265 homicides in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, respectively.151  These three countries
remain among the most violent in the world.152 
A random sampling of the November 18, 2010 edition of El
Salvador’s La Prensa Gráfica helps contextualize the violent situation. 
In the edition are six articles reporting on violent homicides.  For example, a
middle-age couple who owned a dining hall were found dead in Izalco, 
Sonsonate;153 a head was found in San Nicolás Lempa de Tecoluca, San 
Vicente;154 three violent deaths were reported in Usulután;155 three female
breasts were found in containers in the outskirts of San Salvador;156 a 
twenty-three-year-old female was shot dead as she watched her mother’s
sales counter;157 a kindergarten security guard was killed;158 and lastly,
150. The total amount of homicides occurring in Guatemala increased each year 
from 1999–2006.  In 1999, there were 2,655 homicides. By 2006, there were 5,885, an 
increase of approximately 122% U.N. Development Programme [UNDP], Informe
estadístico de la violencia en Guatemala 9 (2007). 
151. Crecen los asesinatos en El Salvador, LA PRENSA (Nic.) (Jan. 3, 2010),
http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2010/01/03/internacionales/12012; Int’l Crisis Group,
Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity 3, June 22, 2010, Latin America
Report No. 33, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c2847a72.html (last
visited Nov. 21, 2010); Fuerte aumento de homicidios en Honduras, LA PRENSA (Hon.)
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.laprensa.hn/Sucesos/Ediciones/2010/04/09/Noticias/Fuerte-
aumento-de-homicidios-en-Honduras. 
152. Based on 2003–2004 figures, San Salvador was 9, 18 and 21 times more
violent that Chicago, Los Angeles and New York City, respectively.  For example, there
were 599 homicides in Chicago in 2003.  However, Chicago would have to register 
5,384 homicides to reach the the homicide rate level in San Salvador.  Juan J. Fogelbach,
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara: El Salvador’s Struggle to Reclaim Social 
Order, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 223, 235 (2005). 
153. Marcos Salguero, Ultiman a pareja de comerciantes en Izalco, LA PRENSA 
GRÁFICA (El Sal.) (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/
departamentos/151944-ultiman-a-pareja-de-comerciantes-en-izalco.html. 
154. Juan Carlos Barahona & Cecilia Ortiz, Reportan homicidio en colonia de
Santa Ana, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.) (Nov. 18, 2010) (this article also reports on the 
violent killing of an alcoholic in Santa Ana). 
155. Carlos Montes, Reportan tres muertes en 24 horas en Usulután, LA PRENSA 
GRÁFICA (El Sal.) (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/
departamentos/151936-reportan-tres-muertes-en-24-horas-en-usulutan.html. 
156. Ricardo Flores, Hallan restos humanos en 3 recipientes, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA
(El Sal.) (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/152013-
hallan-restos-humanos-en-3-recipientes.html. 
157. Jessel Santos, Matan con un arma de fuego a vendedora, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA
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twenty-seven inmates were killed in a fire that took place at the Ilobasco
prison facility.159 
C. Mexican Drug Cartels in El Salvador, Guatemala,    
and Honduras
The Mérida Initiative, a plan to combat drug trafficking and increase 
cooperation primarily between Mexico and the United States, has caused
Mexican drug cartels to spill over into Central America.160  According to
El Salvador’s defense minister, “The more pressure there is in Mexico, the
more the drug cartels will come to Central America looking for a safe
haven.”161  This process is worsened by the disproportionate allocation of
the Mérida Initiative funds between Mexico ($1.15 billion) and Central 
American and Caribbean countries ($275 million).162 
Various Mexican drug gangs are now present in Central America.  Los 
Zetas, formerly the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel and staffed by recruits 
from Mexican special forces, are now present in Honduras, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador.163  It is also believed that Los Zetas have set
up training camps and recruit former military forces in rural Guatemala.164 
The Gulf Cartel has extended its operations from Mexico’s Caribbean coast
to Belize and Nicaragua in cooperation with a Guatemalan gang known
as Los Lorenzana.165  The Sinaloa Cartel, known as the biggest gang in
Mexico, is now present in Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panamá.166 
159. Loida Martínez & Ricardo Flores, Aumenta a 27 el número de fallecidos por 
incendio en penal de Ilobasco, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.) (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/152011-aumenta-a-27-el-numero-
de-fallecidos-por-incendio-en-penal-de-ilobasco.html. 
160. ANDREW SELEE, WOODROW WILSON CTR. FOR INT’L SCHOLARS, OVERVIEW OF
THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 1 (May 2008). 
161. Nick Miroff & William Booth, Mexican drug cartels bring violence with them
in move to Central America, WASHINGTON POST, July 27, 2010. 
162. Moreover, a Government Accountability Office report revealed that only 9%
of funds allocated to Central America have been spent. Id. 
163. Maras Raise the Stakes, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Sept. 16, 2010 at 14.  The 
founders of Los Zetas were members of the Mexican military reportedly trained at the 
School of the Americas to combat counterinsurgencies and drug traffickers.  Arturo
Guzmán Decena deserted the Mexican armed forces in 1997.  In 1999, Guzmán Decena
formed an armed group that became the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel and its then
leader, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén. El origen de “los zetas,”  EL PERIÓDICO (Guat.), Mar.
13, 2009. 
164. Miroff & Booth, supra note 161. 
165. Maras Raise the Stakes, supra note 163. 
166. Id.
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Lastly, the Familia Michoacana has established links in Costa Rica and
Honduras.167 
The exact relationship between the Mexican drug cartels and MS-13
and M-18 is not yet fully known.  According to police in El Salvador,
traffickers are cultivating ties and building alliances with the gangs that
could eventually help them mature into international syndicates.168 
Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes has stated that Los Zetas have 
started to make contacts particularly with MS-13.169 The gangs have
allegedly become involved in the drug business and now dispute over
territory with the drug traffickers.170 
D. Gang Violence and Inadmissibility 
According to the provisions contained in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, aliens who have participated in terrorist activity are 
inadmissible to the United States.171  If an alien is inadmissible, he or she
is statutorily ineligible from a receipt of asylum or withholding of removal. 
Thus, current and former gang members, especially those having voluntarily
joined, may be barred from a receipt of asylum.  Whether in fact they are
will remain at the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of Justice (Executive Office for Immigration Review),
U.S. Courts of Appeals, and perhaps one day, the U.S. Supreme Court.172 
The legal definition of terrorist activity includes, but is not limited to,
“the highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, 
vessel or vehicle)” or “the seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, 
injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third
person to do or abstain from doing any act. . . .”173  Country conditions
reports indicate that gangs engage in terrorist activity as defined.  For
example, gangs highjack a conveyance, to wit a vehicle, by boarding and 
burning a bus.  Furthermore, gangs threaten to kill or injure bus drivers 
and fee collectors in order to compel bus owners to make extortion 
167. Id.
168. Miroff & Booth, supra note 161. 
169. Maras Raise the Stakes, supra note 163. 
170. Id.
171. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 
(West 2010).
172. In Benitez Ramos v. Holder, Judge Posner failed to discuss the security related 
grounds of inadmissibility.  Rather, Judge Posner stated that a gang member may be 
barred under the criminal and related grounds, stating, “for remember the bar for aliens 
who commit a serious nonpolitical crime.”  Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426
(2009). Thus, the application of the security related grounds of inadmissibility in the 
context of protection claims filed by current and former gang members will remain at the
complete discretion of the courts. 
173. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I); 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). 
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payments.  Although not all gang members participate in bus burnings or 
killings, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has issued guidance 
stating that, “Individual responsibility for excludable acts may be presumed 
if membership in a particularly violent group is voluntary.”174 The
U.N. guidance suggests that current or former gang members that
voluntarily joined a gang are ineligible for withholding of removal
or asylum protection.
Furthermore, a gang may be considered a terrorist organization. The 
law defines such an organization as, “a group of two or more individuals,
whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which
engages in” certain activities specified in the law.175  These activities
include, but are not limited to, committing or planning to commit terrorist 
activity.176  Again, gangs engage in terrorist activity when they highjack
and burn buses and kill or threaten to kill bus drivers and fee collectors in 
order to compel bus owners to make extortion payments.  However,
the inadmissibility provisions may be too far reaching if the gangs are
indeed qualified as terrorist organizations.  Such a qualification would 
also render inadmissible the spouse and children of a gang member.177 
V. THE SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF GANGS, STATE RESPONSE, AND 
RESURGENCE OF CLANDESTINE DEATH SQUADS
Violent crime and media coverage play a significant role in shaping 
the public’s perception of gangs. The public’s fear is essential for enacting 
heavy-handed enforcement based responses.  However, the perceived
ineptitude or corruption of the state, namely dictated by its inability to
control violent crime, provides the public with the impetus to take matters 
into its own hands.  In this manner, citizen confidence and faith in
government institutions are diminished.
174. Although UNHCR’s discussion pertains to the criminal related grounds to
inadmissibility, the same argument can be made for the security related grounds of 
inadmissibility. U.N.H.C.R.: Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of 
Organized Gangs, supra note 38, at 20. 
175. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(B)(vi)(III). 
176. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv). 
177. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX). 
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A. The Social Perception of Gangs
The media and government shape the public’s perception of and attitude 
towards gangs.  In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the media
and government sensationalize and exaggerate the scope and criminality
of gangs.178  First, numerical estimates of gang members in each country 
are indeterminate and vary widely.  Second, the government’s massive
campaign against gangs and the media’s tendency to over-exaggerate the 
problem create a misinformed perception that youths in gangs are to 
blame for the majority of crimes in the country.179  The public, in turn, 
lives with a heightened sense of fear and marginalize those perceived as
either current or former gang members.
The high estimates of gang members in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras are respectively four, ten, and fourteen times greater than the 
low estimates. For example, two government sources in El Salvador 
produce drastically different estimates.  According to the National Civilian 
Police there are 10,500 gang members in the country, yet the National
Counsel on Public Security estimates that there are 39,000 members.180 
Similarly, researchers in Honduras state that there are approximately 4,600 
active gang members, but police estimates range from 35,000 to 60,000.181 
Perhaps most incongruous are two estimates issued by Guatemala’s
National Civilian Police.  In 2007, the police said that there are 6,000 
gang members in the country;182 one year later the police estimate rose
to 60,000.183  Although differing definitions of what constitutes a gang 
member may account for the variation, these wide-ranging estimates are 
printed in the media without explanation.184 
The governments and media disproportionately attribute most violent
criminal activity to gangs.  Jorge Bolaños, coordinator of the Homicide 
Investigation Division in El Salvador, claims that gangs are responsible 
for as many as 80% of all homicides.185  His claim is based on abstract 
178. EL SALVADOR PROFILE, supra note 44; GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51. 
179. HONDURAS PROFILE, supra note 57. 
180. EL SALVADOR PROFILE, supra note 44.  10,500 is also the estimate reported by
the U.S. Southern Command and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.  CLARE RIBANDO 
SEELKE, GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (Cong. Research Service, 2009). 
181. The low estimate is produced by the Washington Office on Latin America and 
the high estimate is reported in the news media.  WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., supra
note 57. 
182. Glazer, supra note 68. 
183. Denuncian reclutamiento de niños para delinquir en Guatemala, supra note 
85. 
184. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., supra note 57. 
185. Edmee Velásquez, Esclarecen crímenes a partir del perfil criminológico de
mareros, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), July 12, 2008. In Guatemala, the authorities 
attribute 60% of homicides to gangs.  ELIN CECILIE RANUM, PANDILLAS JUVENILES
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observation of the criminal modus operandi, including but not limited to
the location of the crime scene, type of weapon used to kill, the type of 
victim, and the date and time at which the killing occurred.186  However, 
the participation of gang members was only proved in less than 12% of 
all murder cases that made it to court in 2006.187  Another study published 
by a Brazilian research group in 2005 reports that gangs only commit
approximately 8% of homicides in El Salvador.188  Current and former 
gang members corroborate these findings, stating that the media blames
them for crimes they have not committed.189  The media, according to 
the gang members, also omits the role of other actors in criminal activity
and the identity of the individual or institutional benefactor from criminal 
activity.190 
The inconsistent and exaggerated information printed in the media has 
a twofold effect on the public.  First, public perception of insecurity is 
disproportionately high given actual crime victimization rates. For
example, a poll conducted in El Salvador by the University Institute on 
Public Opinion (IUDOP) reveals that 55% of respondents feel unsafe in
society and an additional 28% feel only somewhat safe.191  Similarly, 45%
of Guatemalans and 33% of Hondurans feel unsafe in society.192  People 
feel most unsafe on public buses and at markets,193 but a surprising amount
TRANSNACIONALES EN CENTROAMÉRICA, MÉXICO Y ESTADOS UNIDOS, DIAGNÓSTICO
NACIONAL: GUATEMALA 19 (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, Universidad 
Centroamericana).
186. Velásquez, supra note 185. Statistics based on abstract observations pose a
serious problem.  For example, M.A. was a former member of MS-13.  He stated that
MS-13 would sometimes kill members who left the gang.  In order to make it look like a 
rival gang killing, M.A. stated that his gang would stab the victim eighteen times.  Thus,
it is possible that social cleansing squads could kill gang members in a manner that
would make it appear like a rival gang killing. 
187. Lemus, supra note 81. 
188. Children in Organized Armed Violence [COAV], El Salvador: Nueve en cada
diez personas que mueren por año en el país son jóvenes entre 15 y 17 años, (Jan. 2005). 
Although El Salvador serves as the primary example, USAID reports that only 7%–8%
of crimes in Honduras are committed by members of youth gangs.  HONDURAS PROFILE, 
supra note 57. 
189. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 68–69. 
190. Id.
 191. INST. UNIV. DE OPINIÓN PÚB., VICTIMIZACIÓN Y PERCEPCIÓN DE INSEGURIDAD
EN EL SALVADOR 24 (2009) [hereinafter VICTIMIZACIÓN Y PERCEPCIÓN].
192. RANUM, supra note 185, at 24; HONDURAS PROFILE, supra note 57. 
193. 90% and 80.5% of Salvadorans feel unsafe on buses and at markets,
respectively. VICTIMIZACIÓN Y PERCEPCIÓN, supra note 191, at 37, 40. 
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of people feel unsafe in their vehicles, at work, and at home.194  Despite
this perception of insecurity, only 16.4% and 13% of Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan respondents, respectively, have been victims of crime.195  It
is this perception of insecurity that is taking the greatest toll on the daily 
lives of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans.196 
Second, the public marginalizes current and inactive gang members 
and supports strong enforcement based anti-gang initiatives that fail to
address the root causes of gang membership.  Former gang members report 
that employers are often unwilling to hire them.197  One observer from
Guatemala notes that, “Many young people are able to give up gangs by
joining a church, but no one will give them jobs.”198  Deportees or former 
gang members with visible tattoos or with limited Spanish language 
skills are especially likely to be discriminated.199  For example, according to
a priest at Colonia Monterrey Church in Honduras, tattooed youth are 
unable to find work.200  This, he specifies, is absurd especially when they
tattooed themselves when they were just fourteen and are now twenty-
five-years-old.  In this manner, marginalized youth may return to gangs.201 
This cycle, in turn, ensures public approval for tough anti-gang initiatives. 
B. The State Response 
The state response to gangs in the region has not been uniform.
Whereas El Salvador and Honduras enacted or redefined pre-existing 
laws to criminalize gang membership, Guatemala failed to follow suit.
Regardless, data on homicides has proven that gang specific legislation 
is ineffective. In addition, efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate gang
members into society have surged in the region. 
194. 56% feel unsafe in their vehicles, 61% feel unsafe at work and 33% feel unsafe 
at home. Id. at 36, 38, 44.
195. Id. at 98; GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51, at 70. 
196. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51, at 70. 
197. SEELKE, supra note 180, at 6. 
198. Ten Young Former Gangsters Start Businesses on Guatemalan Reality TV 
Show, FRONTLINES (USAID), Mar. 2006, at 16. 
199. SEELKE, supra note 180, at 6.  Despite the effect of discrimination, the narrow 
job markets in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras present the greatest obstacle to 
economic participation and integration.  Majella van der Werf, Int’l Inst. of Soc. Studies, 
Questioning the stage: Gang members participation in Guatemala. 
200. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 31. 
201. Id.
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1. El Salvador: Enforcement-Based Efforts 
In October 2003, right wing President Francisco Flores signed into
law temporary legislation (Plan Mano Dura) specifically designed to 
abate the criminal activities of MS-13 and M-18.202  The law was struck
down as unconstitutional by the Salvadoran Supreme Court as it expired 
in April 2004 because it criminalized and loosely defined gang
membership.203  The law also violated international obligations pursuant
to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child because it failed to 
establish an age beneath which a child is considered incapable of
infringing penal law.204  A modified Plan Mano Dura law, however, was
enacted in April 2004.205  This law applied for a period of only ninety
days.206  No suit was filed against this law and it expired pursuant to its own
terms.
The anti-gang laws enabled the authorities to round up gang members 
off the streets.  Enforcement of the laws, however, was highly ineffective.
Reports claim that eight out of ten gang members were returned to the 
streets by judges that either refused to apply the law or were afraid of
reprisals from the gangs.207  Although publicly available reports do not
adequately explore judges’ fears, an article printed in a Salvadoran
newspaper states that a gang member testified in court that MS-13 
planned to kill Judge Delfino Parilla because he sentenced many gang 
members to jail.208  Furthermore, a Civilian National Police report issued
to the Supreme Court of El Salvador warned that MS-13 planned to kill 
202. Ley Anti Maras [LAM-1], Decreto No. 58, Diario Oficial de la República
[DO], Vol. 361, No. 188, pp. 2–10, Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://190.86.209.40/
diarios/do-2003/10-octubre/10-10-2003.pdf (last accessed Feb. 6, 2011). 
203. Fogelbach, supra note 152, at 240–42. 
204. Id. at 243. 
205. Ley Para el Combate de las Actividades Delincuenciales de Grupos o
Asociaciones Ilícitas Especiales, Decreto No. 305, Diario Oficial de la República, Vol. 
363, No. 65, pp.3–7 (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://190.86.209.40/diarios/do-
2004/04-abril/02-04-2004.pdf (last accessed Jan. 23, 2011). 
206. Id.
 207. Wilfredo Salamanca, El ejecutivo presentará propuesta de reforma a la ley 
anti maras, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.) (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://www.
elsalvador.com/noticias/2003/11/06/nacional/nacio16.html (last accessed Jan. 23, 2011). 
208. The gang also planned to kill Astor Escalante, former director of detention
centers, and the director of a youth detention facility in Tonacatepeque.  Karen Molina & 
Edmee Velásquez, El Trece planeó atentar contra juez, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.)
(Dec. 10, 2009) available at http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa. 
asp?idCat=6358&idArt=4331189 (last accessed Jan. 23, 2011). 
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four judges and M-18 closely monitors judges, prosecutors, and police.209 
These reports may encourage judges to release gang members back into 
a society where twelve to fourteen homicides occur each day.210 
Consequently, nearly 73% of Salvadorans polled believe that the anti-
gang laws did little or nothing to reduce the criminal activity of gangs.211 
The legal battle against gangs resurfaced in 2007 when right wing 
President Tony Saca signed into law the Organized and Complex Crimes
Law.212  The law established a set of specialized tribunals staffed with
politically appointed judges tasked with efficiently adjudicating cases 
involving organized or complex crimes.213  These crimes typically involve
homicide, kidnapping, or extortion.214  According to San Salvador Juvenile
Court Judge Doris Luz Rivas Galindo, the executive branch wanted their 
own cadre of judges because judges refused to apply the anti-gang 
law.215  In contrast, the specialized judges contend that they process their 
judicial dockets more efficiently than their counterparts in the ordinary
courts.216  Independent observers note that, “The performance of specialized
tribunals is still very much an open question.  What appears clear, however,
is that the selection process has been politicized and that judges have 
been exposed to pressure to convict defendants.”217 
The horrendous June 20, 2010 bus burning that took place in the San
Salvador suburb of Mejicanos served to remind Congress and the right and
left wings that a serious criminal problem continues to destabilize certain
209. Id.
210. Juan José Dalton, Ola de asesinatos en El Salvador, EL PAÍS (Spain) (Sept. 16,
2009), available at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ola/asesinatos/Salvador/
elpepuint/20090916elpepuint_2/Tes (last accessed Jan. 23, 2011). 
211. VICTIMIZACIÓN Y PERCEPCIÓN, supra note 191, at 45. 
212. Ley Contra el Crimen Organizado y Delitos de Realización Compleja, Decreto 
No. 190, Diario Oficial de la República, Vol. 374, No. 13, pp. 4–7 ( Jan. 22, 2007), 
available at http://www.diariooficial.gob.sv/diarios/do-2007/01-enero/22-01-2007.pdf (last 
accessed Jan. 23, 2011). 
213. The law established special tribunals in San Salvador, Santa Ana and San 
Miguel. The tribunal in San Salvador has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the 
departments of San Salvador, La Libertad, San Vicente, Cuscatlán, Cabañas and
Chalatenango.  The tribunal in Santa Ana has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the
departments of Santa Ana, Sonsonate and Ahuachapán.  Lastly, the tribunal in San 
Miguel has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the departments of San Miguel,
Usulután, La Unión and Morazán. Id. at art. 3.
 214. The Special Tribunals had jurisdiction over organized and complex crime 
involving homicides, kidnappings and extortion. According to the law, organized crimes 
are those involving an organized group of two or more people acting in concert with the 
intent to commit a crime.  In addition, complex crimes are defined as homicides, 
kidnappings or extortion when the crime: (1) is committed by two or more people;
(2) involves 2 or more victims; or (3) provokes social commotion or alarm. Id. at art 1.
 215. PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. 
216. Id. at 26. 
217. Id. at 28. 
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sectors of the country.218  In response, President Mauricio Funes signed
into law El Salvador’s latest edition of anti-gang legislation in September 
2010.219  This marked the first time that the left wing initiated and enacted a
heavy handed enforcement based law to combat gangs and organized crime.
The law gained approval from the right wing National Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) and the center left Christian Democratic Party (PDC).  This law 
specifically outlaws the gangs MS-13, M-18, Máquina, and Mao Mao.220  It
is, however, different from past laws in that it contains forfeiture and
seizure provisions that allow the government to seize property that
belongs to the gangs or their accomplices, or that is otherwise the gain of 
organized criminal activity.221  According to Carlos Ascensio, director of
the Civilian National Police, operations pursuant to this law will focus 
on investigations.222  Ascencio explains that gang sweeps may occur like
they did from 2003–2004, but this time they will be preceded by lengthy 
investigations.223  It is too early to tell whether this law will have any 
effect in reducing violent crime in El Salvador.
2. El Salvador: Rehabilitation and Reintegration Efforts 
In conjunction with enforcement initiatives, El Salvador’s government,
international organizations, and civil society have enacted rehabilitation 
and reintegration programs.  For example, Proyecto MOJE (Movement of
Young Discoverers), based in Ilobasco, works to eliminate gang rivalries,
218. See Tania Membreño & Liliana Fuentes, Ley de Proscripción de Pandillas 
entra en vigor desde hoy, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.) (Sept. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/142340-ley-de-proscripcion-de-pandillas
-entra-en-vigor-desde-hoy.html (last accessed Jan. 23, 2011). 
219. Ley de Proscripción de Maras, Pandillas, Agrupaciones Asociaciones y 
Organizaciones de Naturaleza Criminal, Decreto No. 458, Diario Oficial de la 
República, Vol. 388, No. 189, pp. 23–26 (Sep. 10, 2010) available at http://www.
diariooficial.gob.sv/diarios/do-2010/09-septiembre/10-09-2010.pdf (last accessed Jan.
23, 2011) [hereinafter Ley de Proscripción]. 
220. In addition to the gangs, the law outlaws the Sombra Negra (Black Shadow). 
The Sombra Negra is a death squad that has operated in El Salvador since the mid 1990s.
Id. at Art. 1. For background on the Sombra Negra, see Lawrence Michael Ladutke,
Expressions For and Against the Vigilante Death Squad Sombra Negra, 8 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 283 (2001-02). 
221. According to the law, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security will receive 
60% of the value of seized goods and property. The remaining 40% will be evenly split 
between the Prosecutor’s Office and the Judiciary.  Ley de Proscripción, supra note 219, 
at Art. 4(4). 
222. Membreño & Fuentes, supra note 218. 
223. Id.
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provides technical job training to gang members, conducts workshops on
self-esteem and personal development, and issues an identity card to
participants so that the police know they are in a structured rehabilitation 
program.224  Similarly, three youth outreach centers were opened in El
Salvador with support from USAID.225  The centers teach participants skills
in computer repair and maintenance, welding, banking, and cosmetology.226 
The most recent center opened in Barrio Lourdes and is directed by Carlos 
Artiga, a former gang member turned evangelical pastor.227  The National
Counsel on Public Security under the administration of former President 
Antonio Saca also coordinated two programs: (1) Plan Mano Extendida
(Open Hand Plan), which helped rehabilitate former gang members; and 
(2) Plan Mano Amiga (Friendly Hand Plan), which worked to prevent at-
risk youth from joining gangs.228  These two programs received over 
$730,000 annually to carry out their mission.229  Other programs available 
include tattoo removal services at San Judas Tadeo health center in the San
Salvador suburb of Mejicanos.230 
It is too early to determine the long term success of government
sponsored prevention and rehabilitation efforts.  Proyecto MOJE presents 
an early success story, with reports indicating that it has reintegrated 300 
gang members into society, leaving less than 100 active gang members
in Ilobasco.231 On the other hand, it is generally believed that gang
prevention programs are small scale, ad-hoc, and under funded.232 
Governments in Central America have generally been less involved in 
sponsoring rehabilitation programs, with most funding coming from
church groups or non-governmental organizations (NGO).233 
3. Guatemala: Enforcement and Rehabilitation Efforts 
Unlike their counterparts in El Salvador, the Guatemalan legislature 
did not formally enact anti-gang legislation.  Guatemala considered Plan 
Escoba in 2003, but the legislation was not passed.234  It is believed that
this encouraged gang members from El Salvador and Honduras to
 224. EL SALVADOR PROFILE, supra note 44. 




 228. EL SALVADOR PROFILE, supra note 44. 
229. Id.
 230. Phillippe Revelli, supra note 49. 
231. El Salvador Profile, supra note 44. 
232. SEELKE, supra note 180. 
233. Id.
 234. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 43. 
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migrate to Guatemala.235  In response, the Guatemalan National Civilian 
Police began to conduct anti-gang operations under its own auspices as 
early as August 2003.236 
Police sweeps were ineffective because in the absence of legislation 
that criminalizes gang membership, prosecutors were forced to raise charges 
based on preexisting criminal provisions.237  Prosecutors unsuccessfully 
raised pretext charges, frequently based on weak evidence involving
possession of drugs for personal consumption.238  For example, of 10,527
persons detained between June 2003 and June 2004, only 1.1% were
formally charged in a court of law.239  Thus, most people detained returned
to the streets and there was no reduction in violent crime.  To the contrary, 
homicides increased from 3,632 in 2002 to 5,338 in 2005.240  In 2008,
Guatemala averaged fifteen homicides per day which increased to eighteen 
per day in the first trimester of 2009.241  Largely due to this trajectory, a
new proposal for a gang injunction was received in September 2010.242 
Rehabilitation and prevention-based programs to minimize gang 
proliferation have surged in Guatemala.  For example, the program Escuelas
Abiertas (Open Schools), initiated in July 2008, keeps schools in “red
zones” open on the weekends.243  The Ministry of Education also operates 
425 centers that provide technical and vocational training.244  APREDE, an
alliance of Guatemalan human rights organizations, provides schooling 
and social development activities to help at-risk youth raise their self-
esteem.245  USAID helped establish nine youth outreach centers similar to 
those operating in El Salvador and faith-based organizations provide 
235. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51. 
236. Guatemala: las maras, un blanco en pleno proceso electoral, INFORPRESS, 
Sept. 5, 2003, available at http://www.inforpressca.com/inforpress/infor2003/1527-3.htm.
237. RANUM, supra note 185, at 31. 
238. Id.
239. Id. at 31–32. 
240. Id. at 21. 
241. Claudia Palma, Aumentan homicidios en tres primeros meses, EL PERIÓDICO
(Guat.), Apr. 16, 2009. 
242. Congreso de la República de Guatemala, Patriotas reciben respaldo para
aprobar ley antimaras (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/gt/ver_
noticia.asp?id=11390 (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). 
243. Areas suffering from high criminal and gang activity are dubbed “Red Zones.” 
Denuncian reclutamiento de niños para delinquir en Guatemala, supra note 85. 
244. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51. 
245. Global Youth Connect, Guatemala Program Report, Human Rights Delegation
for Young Leaders January 2–16, 2005, 4 (2005). 
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services to youth.246  Lastly, a modern reintegration effort involved a
reality television show that featured ten former gang members.247 The
participants were split into two competing groups tasked with operating a 
shoe shine and repair business in an upscale office building and a car
wash in downtown Guatemala City.248 
The long term effect of prevention and reintegration efforts cannot yet 
be measured.  One observer reports that, “Some left the gang eight or ten
years ago [and] the lucky ones have found employment.”249  Nevertheless, 
there is little private sector support for rehabilitation programs and the 
faith-based organizations and NGOs that service at-risk youth and former 
gang members are restrained by limited resources.250 
4. Honduras: Enforcement and Rehabilitation Efforts 
Honduras, in contrast to El Salvador, did not enact special legislation
to combat gang activities.  Rather, the enforcement based response revolved
around Article 332 of the Penal Code.  What became known in Honduras as
“Mano Dura” or “Ley Anti Mara” referred to amendments made to
Article 332, enacted in special consideration of the increasing levels of 
gang violence. 
Article 332 was initially a criminal provision intended to primarily 
target the heads or directors of gangs or illicit groups.  Heads and directors
could be sentenced to three to six years imprisonment and subject to a 
fine ranging from 100,000 to 200,000 Lempiras.251  Members of the same 
groups were subject to lesser sentences.252  The first amendment, published
in the Official Register on August 15, 2003, enabled law enforcement to 
round up gang members on the basis of “illicit association.”253  Sentences
for bosses or heads of maras—gangs—and other criminal groups were 
246. Embassy of the U.S. in El Salvador, supra note 225. 
247. Ten Young Former Gang Members Start Businesses on Guatemalan Reality TV
Show, supra note 198. 
248. Id.
249. van der Werf, supra note 199. 
250. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51; SEELKE, supra note 180, at 17. 
251. These terms are contained in the 1983 version of the Honduran Penal Code. 
These provisions intended to criminalize organized crime groups or gangs that pre-
existed the arrival of maras (MS-13 and M-18).   Art. 332, para. 1, Decreto No. 144-83, 
Código Penal [Hond.], 144–83 (Sept. 26, 1983), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/46d7cebe2.html.
252. Members were only subject to one-third of the sentence as a leader or director; 
one to two years imprisonment and approximately 33,000 to 66,000 Lempiras. Id.
253. See HONURAS PROFILE, supra note 57; Decreto No. 223-2004, LA GACETA:
DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS, No. 30163, Mar. 12, 2005, pp. 1–2, 
available at http://www.glin.gov/download.action?fulltextId=98913&documentId=176535 
&glinID=176535. 
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raised to nine to twelve years in prison.254  Sentences for members were 
set at three to four years in prison.255  The next amendment was enacted 
on March 12, 2005.256  Sentences for bosses or heads of maras, gangs, and 
other criminal groups were once again raised to twenty to thirty years in
prison.257  Sentences for members were also raised to seven to ten years 
in prison.258 
These amendments present two significant developments.  First, by 
introducing the word “mara” to Article 332 in 2003, the government shifted 
its focus from organized crime groups to the MS-13 or M-18 gangs
specifically.  Although the Spanish words mara and “pandilla” both mean
gang, the term mara is typically associated with the gangs that proliferated
in Central America after their members were deported from the United
States.259  Second, it is unclear whether these heightened sentences were
permanent or temporary in nature.  In April 2010, a representative from 
the U.N. Committee on the Rights of Children requested Honduras to
abolish Article 332 from its criminal code.260  News articles reporting on 
the U.N.’s request make reference to the sentences contained in the 1983
version of the Penal Code, indicating that the heightened references may
have been temporary in nature.261 
254. ONU, Comité de los Derechos del Niño, Examen de los Informes Presentados 
por los Estados Partes con Arreglo al Artículo 44 de la Convención, CRC/C/HND/3, July
27, 2006 at p.20 (para. 17), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/49d08
d48b2d420d5c125725d002fa1b4/$FILE/G0643345.pdf (last accessed Feb. 7, 2010). 
255. See id.
256. Decreto No. 223-2004, La Gaceta: Diario Oficial de la República de Honduras,




 259. SEELKE, supra note 180, at 4. 
260. This request was made by U.N. representative Susana Villarán de la Puente. 
She advocated for the abolishment of all provisions of law inconsistent with the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of Children. The U.N. request, however, appears to have been
made without special consideration of the serious criminal activities of gang affiliated
youth and fails to offer enlightened alternatives to controlling the activities of criminal 
gangs.  Rather, the U.N. argues that the law violates the freedom of association and its
provisions may be too broadly applied. ONU: Piden a Honduras derogar ley antimaras, 
LA PRENSA (Hon.), Apr. 10, 2010, available at http://www.laprensa.hn/Pa%C3%ADs/
Ediciones/2010/04/20/Noticias/ONU-Piden-a-Honduras-derogar-ley-antimaras;
Representante de la ONU aconseja derogar “Ley anti maras,” LA TRIBUNA (Hon.), Apr.
20, 2010, available at http://www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=121965. 
261. Representante de la ONU aconseja derogar “Ley anti maras,” supra note 260. 
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Although the Honduran government initially hailed the anti-gang
initiative a success, empirical evidence indicates that it was highly
ineffective. According to then President Ricardo Maduro, prior to the 
Penal Code amendment, most gang members were released due to
insufficient evidence.262  This was partly due to the prosecutor’s inability
to procure witnesses, who feared harm from the accused and his or her 
gang.263  The anti-gang law reduced the need for witnesses because it 
criminalized gang membership.  Nevertheless, homicides actually increased 
by 17% in the first year following the enactment of the anti-gang law, and
remain high to date.264  For example, the U.N. Development Program
reports that there were 4,473 murders in 2008, giving Honduras, a nation
of approximately 7.3 million people, one of the world’s highest per capita
murder rates.265 
Enforcement based initiatives have also been accompanied with
rehabilitation and prevention efforts. For example, Adios Tatuajes, a 
tattoo removal service established by the Catholic Church in 2000 in San 
Pedro Sula, has serviced an estimated 16,000 youths.266  According to 
USAID, the Centro para la Tortura, Centro para la Prevención Victoria, 
Casa Alianza, Instituto Hondureño de la Niñez y Familia, and Save the 
Children (United Kingdom) in partnership with local NGO Jha-Ja address 
issues of unemployment and provide drug prevention services to former
gang members.267 Furthermore, the Inter-American Development Bank has
provided $32 million for violence reduction programs; one quarter of the
funds will be used to train gang members in micro-business and reintegrate 
them to society.268 
The prevention and rehabilitation programs have suffered two setbacks.
First, there have been reports of violence directed at participants.  For 
example, twenty-three participants in Save the Children programs have been
killed, prompting the NGO to close operations in March 2007.269  Second, 
262. Heather Berkman, The Politicization of the Judicial System in Honduras and
the Proliferation of Maras, 4 J. INT’L POL’Y STUD. 5, 6 (U.C. San Diego, 2006). 
263. Id.
264. In 2002 there were 3,480 reported homicides; in 2003 there were 4,073.  Id.
 265. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Honduras: Country
Specific Information, (Mar. 19, 2010), http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_ 
1135.html. 
266. Anne Pérez Rivera, Jóvenes quieren eliminarse tatuajes, LA PRENSA (Nic.),
June 21, 2006, available at http://archivo.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2006/junio/21/noticias/
nacionales/125491.shtml; HONDURAS PROFILE, supra note 57. 
267. HONDURAS PROFILE, supra note 57. 
268. Id.
269. Id. Save the Children continues to operate PROGRESA, a food security
initiative in southwest Honduras, and RICA, a childhood development and primary
education program.  SAVE THE CHILDREN, Honduras: Save the Children, http://www.savethe
children.org/countries/latin-america-caribbean/honduras.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
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despite generous grants from international donors, observers report that 
rehabilitation and prevention efforts are generally underfunded.270 
C. The Resurgence of Social Cleansing and Clandestine        
Death Squads
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have struggled to protect the
public from violent crime and gang activity.  Two major problems hinder
the security forces’ ability to control gangs: (1) a lack of resources and
(2) corruption.  The public, consequently, has lost confidence in
the government’s ability to protect them from criminals and gangs. 
The security forces lack human and financial resources.271  According 
to one estimate, there are 16,500, 19,000, and 5,000 police officers in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, respectively.272  In contrast, official 
estimates indicate that there are as many as 39,000 gang members in El 
Salvador, 60,000 in Guatemala, and 60,000 in Honduras.273  Gangs are 
aware of this and feel that the police are unable to control them.  For
example, in December 2009, two alleged gang members threw a grenade 
at a police facility in San Miguel, El Salvador.274  The attack was intended 
to “punish” the police for their efforts to control extortionist gang rings 
operating at the local market.275  The police are so overwhelmed that all 
three countries have mobilized the military to provide greater security.276 
This move has been strongly criticized by some observers owing to the 
memory of human rights abuses during the civil wars.277  Notwithstanding, 
270. SEELKE, supra note 180, at 11. 
271. Latin America Politics: Anti-gang warfare, supra note 43. 
272. Id.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 20–21. 
274. Pandillas perciben $15 mil mensuales de las extorsiones, EL DIARIO DE HOY
(El Sal.), Jan. 5, 2010. 
275. Id.
276. Latin America Politics: Anti-gang warfare, supra note 43. President Mauricio
Funes has deployed over 4,000 soldiers to support the National Civilian Police. 
Extorsiones y pandillas, relato de una víctima, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 6, 2009. 
Approximately 1,500 forces have been present in the following Salvadoran prisons since 
June 2010: San Francisco Gotera, Zacatecoluca, Izalco, Chalatenango and Ciudad Barrios.
Magdalena Flores, Aplican medidas más drásticas en centros penales, CONTRA PUNTO
(El Sal.), Sept. 14, 2010.  In Honduras, it is reported that the 3,000 armed servicemen were
committed to track down and arrest gang members.  Berkman, supra note 262, at 6. 
277. For example, during the civil war, El Salvador’s military was linked to the 
killing of three American nuns, six Jesuit priests and dozens of civilians at El Mozote. 
Anthony Lewis, The U.S. Role in the Horror and Coverup in El Salvador, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 23, 1993. 
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citizens have expressed favor for military participation in the state’s 
gang control efforts since at least 2004.278 
Police, judicial, and government corruption debilitates the security forces’ 
ability to take command of public safety.279  Gang members refer to police
officers as “uniformed gang members” and 77% of former gang members
indicate that they paid bribes to the police.280  There are also reports that
accuse the police of extortion of the gangs.281  In this manner, the police
encourage gang members to extort more businesses and individuals.282 
The police are also aware of internal corruption, with 52% of active duty
police officers in areas heavily affected by gangs stating that their unit is 
corrupt.283  One well-known example involved the arrest of Guatemala’s
national police chief and the head of the anti-narcotics unit in connection
with an April 2009 gunfight that left five police officers dead.284  Similarly, 
reports indicate that judges and prosecutors may be bribed to prevent
gang members from being charged with a crime or convicted.285 In 
February 2010, Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes publicly stated that 
organized crime has infiltrated the police, judiciary, and detention 
facilities.286 
1. El Salvador 
According to official sources, 2009 was the most violent year in the 
last decade, with 4,365 murders.287  Nearly 46% of Salvadorans believe
that the police are involved in criminal activity.288  Against this backdrop,
certain groups have taken the law into their own hands.  Although there 
278. For example, in 2004, Rafael Guardado, a mechanic from Ilopango, El Salvador,
stated, “. . .they should tighten it even more.  Bring in the army to patrol too.”  Chris 
Kraul, El Salvador Comes to Grip with Gangs: Deportees from U.S. feed the violence of
groups targeted in public crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004; Miembros de pandillas
han tratado de infiltrar el Ejército, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), Jan. 20, 2010. 
279. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 43. 
280. DEMOSCOPÍA S.A., supra note 30, at 87, 91. 
281. For example, one gang member in Guatemala states that he has paid the police 
as much as $530 per day in extortion.  Ranum, supra note 185, at 33. 
282. Id.
 283. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 91–92. 
284. Elisabeth Malkin, 2 Top Guatemalan Police Officials Are Arrested on Drug 
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010 at A11. 
285. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 43. 
286. Liset Orellana, Funes dice que el crimen se infiltra en Organo Judicial, Diario 
El Mundo (El Sal.), Jan. 1, 2010, available at http://agacorporativa.net/salas/wp-content/
uploads/2010/02/monitoreo-local-el-salvador-16-de-febrero-2010.pdf. 
287. Jaime López, El Salvador cerró 2009 como el más letal: 4,365 asesinatos, EL 
DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), Jan. 1, 2010, http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_
completa.asp?idCat=6358&idArt=4392824. 
288. In contrast, only 40% believe that the police protects the public.
VICTIMIZACIÓN Y PERCEPCIÓN, supra note 191, at 72. 
456
FOGELBACH ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:45 PM     
 




















   
 











[VOL. 12:  417, 2011] Gangs, Violence, and Victims 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
is no direct evidence indicating that the state participates in clandestine
killings, it is believed that low to mid level police officers participate in 
or facilitate the operations of clandestine groups.289 
In August 2007, a group self-identified as “E.L.” distributed flyers in
the town of Chalchuapa to announce that they were imposing a ten
o’clock curfew.290 The group warned that they will engage in a cleansing 
campaign to get rid of criminals.291  According to observers, residents 
closed their businesses and returned to their homes by nine o’clock.292 
Local police claim that they have no information about either E.L., or 
the persons who distributed the flyers.293 
In early 2010, three gunmen wearing black hoods killed twelve young 
men in two separate coordinated attacks.294  In the first attack, the gunmen
killed seven men near a stream in Milingo (Cuscatlán Department).295 
Three victims had M-18 tattoos on their bodies and two others are 
believed to have belonged to the gang.296  Four days later, similarly dressed 
gunmen entered a restaurant in the outskirts of San Salvador and forced 
five men into a room, stripped their clothes, and scanned their bodies for
gang tattoos.297  Although none had such tattoos, the gunmen killed all 
five young men.298  Subsequent police investigations revealed that the
victims were students and construction workers.299 President Funes, 
although concerned, expressed that he does not believe the killings were 
289. DEMOSCOPÍA, S.A., supra note 30, at 86. 
290. “E.L.” may be an acronym for “Escuadrón de Limpieza,” or cleansing squad. 
Jorge Beltrán, Asesinatos conmocionan a Chalchuapa, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), Aug.
29, 2007, http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=6342&idArt
=1666039. 




 293. Beltrán, supra note 290. 
294. Edgardo Ayala, Killings Bear Hallmarks of Death Squads, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Feb. 17, 2010, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50369. 
295. Id.
296. Jorge Beltrán & Jaime López, PNC aún sin hipótesis sobre massacre de
Milingo, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/ 
nota_completa.asp?idCat=6358&idArt=4488179. 
297. Four of the victims were between 23 and 25 years of age; one victim was 52-
years-old.  Claudia Huete, Masacre en Tonacatepeque, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.),
Feb. 7, 2010, http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/91626–masacre-en-
tonacatepeque.html; Ayala, supra note 294. 
298. See Ayala, supra note 294. 
299. Id. 
 457




















    
 
 





orchestrated by death squads.300  Nevertheless, analysts believe that “it is
practically inconceivable that three gang members would decide to attack a
group of ten people.  That is only done by ‘special forces’ or so called
‘commandos,’ who are trained precisely to use just a few men to overcome 
or annihilate larger units or groups.”301 
Other reports also indicate that social cleansing groups may be at work 
in El Salvador.  For example, the Mayor of San Miguel acknowledged
that two extermination groups, La Sombra Negra and Comando Maximiliano 
Hernández have ordered criminals and extortionists to abandon the city.302 
In 2007, five police investigators in the eastern region of El Salvador 
were detained in prison after a court of law determined that there was 
sufficient evidence indicating that they may belong to extermination
groups.303 Lastly, in January 2010, human rights ombudsman Oscar Luna
said that he received telephone death threats from persons claiming to
belong to a death squad.304  The callers warned Luna to leave the country 
and ordered him to stop interfering with their clandestine operation.305 
2. Guatemala 
According to the National Institute for Forensic Science, Guatemala 
registered 5,975 homicides in 2009.306  Guatemalans are frustrated with 
the government’s inability to provide public security and justice for its 
citizens.307  Wealthier businesses and citizens are increasingly relying on 
the private sector for security and 31% of Guatemalans surveyed believe
that it is acceptable to take justice into one’s own hands.308 
In a December 2009 report, Amnesty International (AI) accused the 
Guatemalan government of tolerating extrajudicial killings of criminals 
supposedly committed by members of the Civilian National Police.309 
According to AI, victims are commonly found in open fields or trash 
300. Id. at 3.
301. Id. at 1–2.
302. Aparición de grupos de “limpieza social” en Centroamérica enciende
alarmas, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 14, 2006, available at http://www.radiola 
primerisima.com/noticias/3628. 
303. Dalton, supra note 290. 
304. Alma Vilches, Arzobispo repudia amenazas de muerte contra el Procurador 
Oscar Luna, DIARIO CO LATINO (El Sal.), Jan. 25, 2010, http://www.diariocolatino.
com/es/20100125/nacionales/76097/?tpl=69. 
305. Ayala, supra note 293. 
306. Asesinatos en Guatemala centrados en 5 departamentos, Radio La
Primerísima (Guat.), Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.radiolaprimerisima.com/noticias/68291. 
307. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51. 
308. Id.
 309. Amnesty Int’l, Allegations of Police Killings in Guatemala must be Investigated, 
Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/allegations-
police-killings-guatemala-must-be-investigated-20091215.
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cans, exhibiting signs of torture, and either strangled or shot at close
range.310  Although there is no tangible proof that the state participates in
social cleansing, local observers note that the police and judicial authorities
fail to investigate extrajudicial killings and are complicit in the activities 
of death squads.311 
There are few, but notable reports on clandestine groups and killings. 
For example, in 2006, a group self-identified as Guardianes de la Ciudad
(Guardians of the City) distributed flyers in Coatepeque to inform residents 
that they will eliminate all gang members because the police are incapable 
of securing society.312  In February 2006, the cadavers of seven alleged gang
members were found along a desolate highway southeast of the capital.313 
Lastly, a number of corpses, nearly all young males exhibiting gang-
style tattoos, were discovered in and around Guatemala City in 2000.314 
The victims displayed signs of torture and violent death, leading some to 
suspect the government of social cleansing.315 
3. Honduras 
In 2009, Honduras had the highest homicide rate in Central America.316 
A significant portion of the victims are believed to be street children.  It 
is estimated that 2,000 youth were killed between 2000 and 2007.317 
The Inter American Court of Human Rights found Honduras guilty of 
participation in many of these deaths.318  In addition, the Honduran police 
have been accused of carrying out child executions as part of a prolonged 
310. Amnistía Internacional acusó a Guatemala de tolerar “limpieza social,” EFE
(Guat.), Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://noticias.com.gt/nacionales/20091215-amnistia-
internacional-acuso-a-guatemala-de-tolerar-limpieza-social.html.
311. Ayala, supra note 294; Aparición de grupos de “limpieza social” en 
Centroamérica enciende alarmas, supra note 302. 
312. Surge ‘escuadrón de limpieza social’ contra las ‘maras’, EFE (Guat.), Sep. 26, 
2006, available at http://noticias.terra.com/articulo/html/act234693.htm.
313. Imparable criminalidad hace temer “limpieza social” en Guatemala, EFE,
Feb. 11, 2006, available at http://noticias.terra.com/articulo/html/act338024.htm. 
314. GUATEMALA PROFILE, supra note 51. 
315. Id.
316. The homicide rate was 66.8 per 100,000 inhabitants.  From 2005–2009, it is 
estimated that 36% of homicides were committed by hired assassins.  Honduras registra
la mayor tasa de homicidios en Centroamérica, según informe, EFE, Mar. 30, 2010, 
available at http://www.terra.com.ec/noticias/articulo/html/act2263740.htm. 
317. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., supra note 57. 
318. Id.
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social cleansing campaign.319  Hundreds of children are discovered each 
year, often with their hands bound, killed by a single gunshot to the back
of the head.320  It is possible that street children are likely targets because
they may be considered at-risk of future gang membership. 
There are few reports of social cleansing and clandestine death squad 
activity. In 1998, a clandestine group known as Papá Commando (Father
Commando) issued a statement to the media threatening to kill members 
of youth gangs.321  Similarly, a clandestine group self-titled Los Magníficos
(literally The Magnificents, popularly The A-Team) has operated in and
around San Pedro Sula.322  The group is composed of twenty-five member
units.323 It is believed that Los Magníficos is made up of police and
former military members who may have been members of Battalion 316,
a military death squad that carried out extrajudicial killings of political
opponents in the 1980’s.324 
4. Prison Fires and Riots
In the last decade, there have been various prison riots and fires that
claimed the lives of many inmates, including gang members.  Although 
there is little to no evidence that the states engage in purposeful social
cleansing of the prison population, observers note that the authorities fail
to intervene in riots and extinguish fires.325  Furthermore, the weapons
used by inmates during riots suggests that the authorities are either
complicit in, or have no ability to control the violence. 
Gangs in prisons have reportedly used guns, improvised grenades,
machetes, and knives to kill rivals or members of the general prison 
319. Jenny Kleeman, Zero Tolerance for the Child Gangs of Honduras, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1565985/Zero-tolerance-
for-the-child-gangs-of-Honduras.html. 
320. Id.
 321. DOUGLAS PAYNE, U.S. BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
HONDURAS: UPDATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS 19 (2000), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de8d7a64.html. 
322. Aparición de grupos de “limpieza social” en Centroamérica enciende alarmas, 
supra note 302. 
323. Id.
 324. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2006 THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF
POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES: HONDURAS 313,  (Aili Piano, et al. eds., 2006). 
325. In May 2004, 105 alleged gang members burned to death in a Honduran prison
while guards did nothing. Tom Hayden, Commentary, When Deportation is a Death
Sentence; Sending U.S. Gang Members Back to Honduras Can Amount to Killing Them, 
L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at B9, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/28/ 
opinion/oe-hayden28.  In Guatemala, a fight between rival gangs left seven prisoners 
dead, five of them beheaded. The riot lasted approximately five hours before prison 
guards and police regained control of the prison.  Beheadings in Guatemala Jail Riot, 
BBCNEWS (U.K.), Nov. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7744335.stm. 
460
FOGELBACH ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:45 PM     
 


























[VOL. 12:  417, 2011] Gangs, Violence, and Victims 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
population.  For example, a 2004 riot in La Esperanza prison (El Salvador) 
began when members of M-18 threw an improvised grenade at inmates.326 
Similarly, a riot broke out at the San Pedro Sula Prison (Honduras) after 
the shooting of an inmate.327  In the ensuing violence, inmates hacked eight 
gang members to death with knives and machetes.328  Lastly, it is believed 
that inmates in Guatemalan prisons have easy access to weapons.329 It is 
apparent that the detention centers either provide weapons to inmates or 
lack sufficient security measures to prevent inmates from obtaining them.
Prison fires have also left large amounts of inmates dead.  In 2003, a 
supposedly accidental prison fire claimed the lives of sixty-eight inmates 
in Honduras.330  Investigators, however, later discovered that the killings
started with a mass execution by police firing at close range.331  Most  
recently, in November 2010, a fire at the Ilobasco detention center (El
Salvador) left twenty-seven inmates dead.332  Initial reports say the fire
broke out after an electrical wire overheated.333
 326. Jaime García, Masacre en la cárcel, EL DIARIO DE HOY (El Sal.), Aug. 19, 
2004, http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2004/08/19/nacional/nac13.asp#. 
327. Nine Killed with Machetes in Honduran Prison Riot, REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2628387120080427. 
328. Id.
329. Beheadings in Guatemala Jail Riot, supra note 325. Prison riots have also
taken place in Guatemala. See Deadly Guatemala Jail Riot Ends, BBC NEWS (U.K.),
Feb. 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6398945.stm; Masacre en cárcel de
Guatemala, EL NUEVO DIARIO (Nic.), Sept. 25, 2006, http://impreso.elnuevodiario.
com.ni/2006/09/25/internacionales/29776. 
330. Hayden, supra note 325. 
331. Id.
332. Loida Martínez & Ricardo Flores, Aumenta a 27 el número de fallecidos por 
incendio en penal de Ilobasco, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.), Nov. 18, 2010, http://www. 
laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/152011-aumenta-a-27-el-numero-de-fallecidos-
por-incendio-en-penal-de-ilobasco.html.
333. Fernando Romero & Loida Martínez, Incendio Ilobasco por recalentamiento 
de cable, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (El Sal.), Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-
salvador/judicial/151748—incendio-ilobasco-por-recalentamiento-de-cable.html. 
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The information contained in this report is intended to provide the
reader with a wide view of gangs, violence, and the state response in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  What started as Los Angeles,
California based street gangs, have transformed into full-fledged
transnational gangs.  Gang violence has contributed to, but is not the sole 
cause of violence in the region.  Gangs commit homicides, operate 
organized extortion rings, and at times carry out massacres of civilians. 
The state has primarily responded by enacting a series of gang injunctions 
that have been ineffective and failed to reduce violent crime in the region. 
Gangs have become more violent and have reportedly started to forge 
ties with Mexican drug cartels.  If this is true, violence will likely increase 
and negatively affect citizen security in Central America.  This is dangerous
in a setting where law enforcement is considered either inept or corrupt.
Some citizens will flee; others may continue to form violent clandestine 
groups intended to cleanse society of individuals they perceive as a social 
disease. In the medium to long term this may affect the stability of the 
regional democratic institutions as the perception of socially diseased
individuals may encompass not only gang members, but also the governing 
authorities. 
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